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I. INTRODUCTION
There is only one Constitution,1 and it is written.  The Constitu-
tion’s words are authoritative, but they are not conclusive.  And
1. See Richard A. Posner, A Lawyer’s Dozen, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 8, 2012, at 36.  In his
review of  Yale Law Professor Akhil Amar’s America’s Unwritten Constitution, Seventh Circuit
Judge Richard Posner claims that Amar advocates for eleven unwritten constitutions: an “im-
plicit” constitution, a “lived” constitution, a “Warrented” constitution (in reference to Earl War-
ren), a “doctrinal” constitution, a “symbolic” constitution, a “feminist” constitution, a
“Georgian” constitution (in reference to George Washington), an “institutional” constitution, a
“partisan” constitution (in reference to political parties, which are not mentioned in the written
Constitution), a “conscientious” constitution (which, for example, permits judges and jurors to
ignore valid law), and an “unfinished” constitution that “Amar is busy finishing.” Id.
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neither originalism,2 nor the “dynamic approach,”3 can solve the mys-
teries presented by the Constitution’s generalized language. What can
be said, however, is that the Constitution contains three written and
unwritten mandates that unite its structural and individual rights sec-
tions: equality, liberty, and democratic governance.4 This article ar-
gues that equality is the prerequisite to an enduring form of liberty
and a truer democracy.  It defines equality as increasing citizen partici-
pation in the legislative process through a political system in which
votes actually matter and elected officials are more accountable to
those they serve.  Without equality, neither liberty nor democracy, in
the forms envisioned by the Constitution, is possible.
The United States Supreme Court has failed to bring us closer to
this vision.  Instead, the Court has created a separate but unequal
Constitution that is “living”5 for all of the wrong reasons and “evolv-
ing”6 in undemocratic ways.  This is not an indictment or attack on the
Court, but it is the consequence of three fundamental errors that have
plagued its jurisprudence: the Court’s predilection to focus its opin-
ions not on constitutional principles, but on outcomes, uniformity, and
inconsistency.  And it is also about power—the Court’s own power
vis-a`-vis, and at the expense of, the power exercised by the people and
the coordinate branches.
To be sure, there is nothing inherently wrong with a focus on out-
comes.  The Justices are pragmatists,7 not robots.  They do not apply
legal rules in a vacuum, and often make “choices that entail the exer-
cise of legislative-like judicial discretion.”8  They understand that law
is not separate from politics, just as opinions are not without conse-
quences.9  Thus, pragmatism should not be viewed as a tool for judi-
cial activism, but as the desire to be “reasonable in light of the warring
interests in the cases.”10  Likewise, legislators and commentators
2. Diane P. Wood, Our 18th Century Constitution in the 21st Century World, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1079, 1080 (2005).
3. Id.
4. See James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (1995).
5. See James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings
of the American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1175 (2012).
6. Bertrall L. Ross II, Against Constitutional Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1208
(2011).
7. Edward Whelan, How Judge Posner Thinks Judges Should Think: An Unpersuasive Case
for Pragmatism, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 17, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/
articles/224135/how-judge-posner-thinks-judges-should-think/edward-whelan#.
8. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 203 (2008).
9. Whelan, supra note 7.
10. POSNER, supra note 8, at 249.
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should also hesitate before seeking the abolition of pragmatism,11
which would “make judges even less candid than they are”12 and “in-
advertently give greater play to judges’ personal and political precon-
ceptions in cases involving discretion.”13  Scholars should rethink the
value of endlessly debating interpretive theories, arguing that the
Constitution has numerous unwritten constitutions,14 or claiming to
have identified the unspoken purposes underlying the Constitution’s
text.15  The focus should be on finding the right kind of pragmatism.
The Supreme Court’s current pragmatism is understandable, but
not the right approach.  It is driven, in part, by an institutional reality:
the Court’s decision is the final word.  Its interpretation of a law or
statute becomes the policy that will govern individuals, groups, and
institutions for the foreseeable future—and perhaps forever.  After
all, no other branch can invalidate a Court opinion as unconstitu-
tional.  The Court alone has the final say.  As a result, while legal for-
malisms and textually-derived penumbras16 may give the Court’s
decisions the “appearance of judicial rigor,”17 they are more aptly de-
scribed as pragmatic attempts to find the right answers for everyone.
As discussed in Part II, those answers have resulted in inconsistency,
inequality, and misguided uniformity.
Under its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, for example, the
Court has prohibited every state from executing child rapists.18  Its
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, however, has allowed every state to
effectively deprive indigent defendants of the right to counsel, which
has led to grave injustices, including the execution of innocent peo-
ple.19  Furthermore, in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court has issued highly questionable and sweeping rulings20 that have
removed social policy questions from democratic discourse.  But the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has allowed corporations and
lobbyists to become contemporary de facto “citizens,” and has se-
verely compromised the political process.  And if, as Yale Law School
11. Whelan, supra note 7.
12. POSNER, supra note 8, at 251.
13. Whelan, supra note 7.
14. See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1797, 1802.
15. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1935, 1954.
16. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
17. Whelan, supra note 7.
18. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008).
19. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
20. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2014] THE UNEQUAL CONSTITUTION 117
Professor Akhil Amar argues, “clause-bound interpretivism”21 or “in-
tratextualism”22 should be rejected in favor of an “organic-unity hol-
ism,”23 then it begs the question of why the Court’s jurisprudence is
anything but holistic.24  One answer might be that the “what works
best” approach25 for each Justice is entirely subjective and depends on
the interpretive lens through which that Justice views the Constitu-
tion.  Often, it depends not only on what the Constitution means, but
what each Justice wants it to mean.  Thus, the Court’s opinions are
often more an exercise in each Justice’s will than an exercise in princi-
pled and constitutional jurisprudence.
That, however, should not be the focus of debate. Since pragmatism
does not “grind[ ] out certifiably correct answers to legal questions,”26
and “a reasonable decision is not necessarily a ‘right’ one,”27 the real
question is whether the Court’s pragmatism has in fact led to a higher
degree of citizen participation in the political and democratic process.
As discussed below, the answer in the individual rights context is no.
The Court’s decisions, for example, have thwarted the coordinate
branches’ attempts to repair the political process through campaign
finance legislation, and have prevented states from addressing
uniquely local problems.28  Tellingly, in many cases, the Court could
only get to these results through manipulating or ignoring the Consti-
tution’s text,29 or by creating dubious legal doctrines—such as sub-
stantive due process30—to give its decisions the “appearance of
intellectual rigor.”31  Of course, substantive due process, which can be
21. James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211, 222
(1993).
22. Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 756 (2000).
23. Solum, supra note 15, at 1963.
24. See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV.
145, 168 (2008) (“Intratextual analysis is a centuries-old and often elegant form of holistic legal
reasoning, but one that must be used with caution and close attention to context.”).
25. Christos Papapetrou, Payton, Practical Wisdom, and the Pragmatist Judge: Is Payton’s
Goal To Prevent Unreasonable Entries or To Effectuate Home Arrests?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1517, 1527–28 (2007).
26. POSNER, supra note 8, at 249.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
29. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation,
and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1485, 1491 (2012).
30. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamental: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 984 (2006).
31. POSNER, supra note 8, at 176.
118 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:113
traced to the Court’s early jurisprudence,32 would not be problematic
if its intent were to increase equality in the democratic and political
process.  But substantive due process has been used to circumvent the
Constitution’s textual limits on judicial review.  The result is a sepa-
rate but unequal Constitution.  It works for the wealthy.  It rewards
the powerful. But it ignores the poor, the disenfranchised, and the
disempowered.
This Article argues for a new type of pragmatism and recognizes
that categorical approaches, such as curtailing judicial review,33 letting
the states decide,34 or reforming the nomination process,35 are not re-
alistic.  It begins by recognizing that, for better or worse, the Court
has become the third political branch.36  For example, advocacy
groups have increasingly looked to the Court, not the legislature, to
address fundamental questions involving government power and indi-
vidual rights.37  Additionally, the Constitution’s text is not determina-
tive, and its words are destined to evolve in light of contemporary
norms.38  Given these facts, and coupled with its role as the final arbi-
ter of these disputes, the Court’s approach has predictably tran-
scended legal formalism.  It has embraced, either out of need or
desire, a pragmatic philosophy.39
The right kind of pragmatism should focus less on defining liberty,
equality, and democracy, and more on how they can be harmonized to
achieve equal access to the political and legislative processes so that
citizens can, within constitutional constraints, define and live under
their definitions of liberty.  Thus, the Court’s jurisprudence should
strive to (1) enhance individual participation in the political process;
32. Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 984–85; see also Stephen M. Feldman, Unenumerated Rights
in Different Democratic Regimes, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 47 (2006).
33. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular Constitution-
alism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 677.
34. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Which Constitution? Who Decides?: The Problem of Judicial
Supremacy and the Interbranch Solution, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1055, 1107 (2006).
35. See Elizabeth Anderson, The Problem of Politics and Appointments to the Federal Bench:
Looking to England for Guidance in Creating a Less Politicized Process, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV.
653, 657–60 (2013).
36. See Frank B. Cross, Law as Courtesy?, 47 TULSA L. REV. 219, 222–223 (2011) (reviewing
KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT: ACCEPTABLE
HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW (2010)).
37. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1238–39 (2010) (discussing the evolution of marriage equality through the
courts).
38. Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1189–90 (2012).
39. See Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, 31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 875, 886–87 (2008).  “Modern-day advocates of pragmatism as the correct theory
of judicial decision-making think judges should give a lot of weight to the consequences their
decisions produce.” Id. at 887.
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(2) facilitate the efficient administration of government; (3) give states
more latitude to address uniquely local problems; and (4) allow states
to arrive at different reasonable conclusions on social rights issues.  If
legislation cannot be said to violate the Constitution’s text, or the
Court’s precedent, then the Court should allow it to be resolved
through the democratic process.  In other words, if the Constitution is
“unfinished,”40 as Professor Amar claims, then in most cases the peo-
ple, not the courts, should fill in the blanks.
Part II defines liberty, equality, and democracy.  It also discusses
the Court’s inconsistent approach to individual rights jurisprudence,
which has weakened the political and legislative processes.
Part III sets forth a new type of pragmatism by introducing an intra-
state conception of the Eighth Amendment that would confine the
Court’s “evolving standards of decency”41 analysis to within, rather
than among, the states.  It is based on the belief that liberty in its
truest sense requires citizens to have equal access and influence in the
political and legislative processes, and requires courts to analyze state
laws in an individualized, rather than collective, manner.  In other
words, judicial pragmatism should facilitate equal participation, not
outcomes.42
Part III also addresses the question of when the Court should en-
force substantive constitutional values regardless of citizen or legisla-
tive choices, and discusses instances when the Court has undermined
citizen equality in governance.  First, the Court should invalidate duly
enacted laws that violate a textual provision of the Constitution.  Sec-
ond, it should address arbitrariness, requiring the invalidation of laws
motivated by, among other things, moral views or bias toward individ-
uals or groups.  Third, it should find generally-applicable laws facially
invalid if they impose an arbitrary burden, and should find laws un-
constitutional as applied if they burden an individual’s or group’s ex-
ercise of a fundamental right.  Fourth, the Court should focus on
protecting minority rights by examining the processes by which a law
is adopted, including the degree to which participation is not fully re-
alized.  Ultimately, equality is the prerequisite to the type of liberty
and democracy that creates rights from citizen engagement—not judi-
cial imposition.
40. Posner, supra note 1, at 40.
41. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
42. Of course, laws that invidiously discriminate or otherwise subject individuals or groups to
discrimination should be invalidated because they violate a specific textual provision. See infra
notes 494–496 and accompanying text.
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II. LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Liberty, equality, and democratic governance are the foundations of
the Constitution’s written and unwritten mandates.  As United States
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer explains, “[T]he Constitution
provides a framework for the creation of democratically determined
solutions, which protect each individual’s basic liberties and assure
that individual equal respect by government . . . .”43  This Article de-
fines equality in both substantive and procedural terms, views liberty
through a classical lens, and offers a pragmatic solution to reconcile
judicial review with democratic self-governance.
A. Equality: Procedural and Substantive
Equality “is . . . an elusive concept,”44 particularly because “courts,
in exercising their interpretive legal functions, have to provide all per-
sons the equal protection of the laws.”45  The Court’s jurisprudence,
however, suggests that equality has procedural and substantive as-
pects, and that they share an interdependent relationship.
1. Procedural Equality
Procedural equality is about due process and fairness.  In Matthews
v. Eldridge,46 the Court set forth three factors that are ordinarily re-
quired before an individual may be deprived of a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty or property interest.  The Court held that procedural
due process “imposes constraints on governmental decisions which
deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the mean-
ing of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.”47
To begin with, “some form of hearing is required before an individ-
ual is finally deprived of a property interest.”48  Indeed, the “right to
be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind,
even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal
conviction, is a principle basic to our society.”49  In some cases, this
may require “an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation.”50  A
43. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 271–72 (2002).
44. Berta Esperanza Herna´ndez-Truyol, Virtual Equality as Constitutional Reality: An Intro-
duction, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 1 (1995).
45. Id.
46. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
47. Id. at 332.
48. Id. at 333.
49. Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 333.
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second consideration is the “fairness and reliability of the existing
pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional procedural safeguards.”51  The final factor considered is “the
administrative burden and other societal costs that would be associ-
ated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary
hearing.”52  Ultimately, the fairness of the procedures must be ana-
lyzed in light of the “degree of potential deprivation that may be cre-
ated by a particular decision.”53
Certainly, procedural fairness is vital to ensuring that constitutional
rights are protected against arbitrary deprivation.  Fair procedures,
however, are not sufficient by themselves.  The government may not,
for example, claim that an otherwise arbitrary law is valid simply be-
cause it comports with procedural due process.54  As discussed below,
equality has substantive aspects, enshrined in the Bill of Rights, which
include the right to be free from discrimination and universally appli-
cable but arbitrary laws that uniquely burden the exercise of funda-
mental liberties.  No procedures, no matter how fair, can justify the
deprivation of these liberties.
2. Substantive Equality
Substantive equality can be neutral, by treating “similarly-situated
people similarly.”55  It also authorizes special treatment for certain in-
dividuals or groups, or operates to recognize and accommodate differ-
ences.56  Neutral equality is based on the concept of “‘treating
similarly-situated people similarly”57 even though “such a formulation
does not always yield neutral results.”58  Other definitions are predi-
cated on dominance, and hedonic and pragmatic considerations.59  In-
deed, the “multiplicity of strands, approaches and definitions, creates
more than the appearance”60 of disagreement, and definitions of
51. Id. at 343.
52. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 347.
53. Id. at 341.
54. See, e.g., Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (The Due Process Clause
“protects individual liberty against ‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.’” (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986))) .
55. Herna´ndez-Truvol, supra note 44, at 2; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 400, 495
(1954).
56. Herna´ndez-Truyol, supra note 44, at 2–3.
57. Id. at 2; see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
58. Herna´ndez-Truyol, supra note 44, at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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equality are “predicated upon . . . factors that may be inimical to the
very notion of equality, e.g., cultural bias and prejudice.”61
Certainly, substantive equality requires, among other things, that in-
dividuals be protected from discrimination and arbitrary government
conduct that uniquely burdens the exercise of basic liberties.  There
can be no doubt that substantive equality is enshrined in the Constitu-
tion’s text and is a prerequisite to a more fully realized liberty.
But the Court has paid insufficient attention to procedural equality
and the ways in which it can enhance substantive forms of liberty and
facilitate a more participatory democracy. In addition to basic due
process protections, procedural equality should also focus on increas-
ing access to the political and democratic spheres.  Due process should
not simply focus on guarding against arbitrary deprivation by the
state, but also on making sure that citizens, who must obey all duly
enacted laws, have a meaningful voice in their creation.  Not only does
this give equality a more substantive meaning, but it also provides lib-
erty with an important procedural safeguard. Specifically, it allows cit-
izens to participate in defining and identifying the rights to which they
will be subject.  As explained below, this approach supports a classi-
cal, not contemporary, understanding of liberty.
B. Liberty: Classical Versus Contemporary Liberalism
As Justice Breyer explains, “The United States is a nation built on
principles of human liberty—a liberty that embraces concepts of de-
mocracy.”62  Broadly speaking, the “liberty of the ancients”63 con-
sisted of “active and constant participation in collective power.”64  It
entrusted to “all the citizens, without exception, the care and assess-
ment of their most sacred interests.”65  A participatory form of liberty
“ennobles their thoughts, and establishes among them a kind of intel-
lectual equality which forms the glory and power of a people.”66
Classical and contemporary liberalism are similar in some respects.
Both theories embrace “the concept that people have certain personal
liberties that are intrinsic to respect for them as persons and that are
therefore legally and morally inalienable, either by their fellow[ ]citi-
61. Id.
62. Breyer, supra note 43, at 245.
63. Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns
(1816), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 309–28 (Biancamaria Fontana trans. & ed., 1988).
64. Id. at 316.
65. Id. at 327.
66. Id.
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zens or by the State.”67  They also maintain that “a frontier must be
drawn between the area of private life and that of public authority,”68
thus creating “a zone of privacy, or area of personal moral liberty se-
cured against governmental intrusion.”69
Importantly, however, classical and contemporary liberalism part
ways on the manner in which rights should be created and have differ-
ent visions of democracy.  While both share a view of negative liberty
as “the right of individuals to make personal moral decisions free from
governmental interference,”70 they diverge in their definition of posi-
tive liberty and the creation of rights.
1. Classical Liberalism
Classical liberalism asserts that it is “the equal right of each [person]
to exercise those individual liberties the people have collectively guar-
anteed to all by laws enacted on a free and equal basis, including both
personal and political liberties.”71   This requires the State “to ensure
that personal liberties enumerated in the Constitution or traditionally
held to be inalienable are not infringed by the State on any state or
federal level.”72
Furthermore, classical liberalism defines positive liberty as the right
of the people to design and create their own government based on
“such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own
happiness.”73  It grants the people the right “to maintain for them-
selves, as free and equal citizens, a social compact of ordered liberties
grounded in the Constitution and the moral law.”74  Thus, positive lib-
erty manifests itself through voting and the legislative acts of the peo-
ple’s representatives, as well as “the interpretive acts of the
judiciary.”75  The people, however, retain “the right to refine and
redefine those liberties within the constraints they themselves have set
out in their Constitution and their laws.”76
67. Evelyn Keyes, The Just Society and the Liberal State: Classical and Contemporary Liber-
alism and the Problem of Consent, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 55 (2011).
68. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 191, 196
(Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 2000).
69. Keyes, supra note 67, at 56 (emphasis omitted).
70. Id. at 55 (“[P]eople have private lives in which they are free to make their own moral
decisions without the imposition upon them of society’s moral point of view.”).
71. Id. at 56.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)).
74. Id.
75. Keyes, supra note 67, at 56.
76. Id.
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2. Contemporary Liberalism
Contemporary liberalism defines positive liberty in a more anti-
democratic and less egalitarian sense.77  Individuals have an “inaliena-
ble equal basic liberty of personal self-determination . . . to direct their
personal lives in accordance with the ‘best’ constructions of the ra-
tional requirements of liberty and equality . . . which the State is inde-
pendently empowered to identify and enforce.”78  While
contemporary liberalism emphasizes individual liberty, its purpose is
to guard against “the excesses of democratic majorities and those act-
ing in their name.”79  Most notable is the contemporary liberal view of
equality:
The contemporary liberal conception of the State as the guarantor
of equal basic positive liberties it independently identifies as ration-
ally implied by the core moral concepts of liberty and equality is
entirely alien to classical liberalism grounded in a theory of consen-
sual justice.  For, in incorporating the concept of the rational and
impartial State as independent moral arbiter and guarantor of equal
liberty for all, contemporary liberalism necessarily denies the origi-
nal moral and political right of a free people to participate equally
in identifying and defining their own individual basic personal liber-
ties collectively and to constitute their government and adapt their
laws as they rationally deem fair and best for all.80
Contemporary liberalism also gives states the power “to decree, in-
dependently of the will of the people, where equal personal liberty
begins and ends under the objectively true principles of justice as fair-
ness.”81  Thus, it “recognizes no constraints, other than the constraints
of reason and moral truth, upon the authority of the State to discover
the ‘truly democratic’ requirements of the concepts of equality and
liberty.”82
Furthermore, contemporary liberalism is viewed as freeing oneself
“from spiritual slavery to one’s lower actual self and identifying one-
self with one’s ‘real,’ or ‘ideal,’ or ‘autonomous’ self, or with [one’s]
self ‘at its best.’”83  The real or autonomous self “is then . . . associated
with the moral, or ideal, rational State, which exerts moral authority
over the lower, empirical self.”84 The only principles “recognized as
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Breyer, supra note 43, at 246.
80. Keyes, supra note 67, at 58.
81. Id. at 57.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 56 (quoting Berlin, supra note 68, at 204) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
84. Id. at 56–57.
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binding upon the sovereign general assembly or independent judiciary
are the objectively true principles of justice as fairness.”85
Contemporary liberal theorists therefore believe that it is the “duty
of the just State” to assure that privacy and other rights are not “in-
fringed by . . .  any citizens or body of citizens, such as a state legisla-
ture or a ‘moral majority.’”86  Significantly, contemporary liberalism
believes it is the “traditional role of the judiciary to protect them
against just that.”87
Ultimately, classical and contemporary liberalism present two com-
peting views regarding “whether it is the role of the State, acting inde-
pendently through a sovereign assembly or judiciary, or the role of the
people, acting through freely and equally elected legislatures and
traditional courts, to define the limits of the law.”88
The Court’s majority today endorses the contemporary approach.
As one commentator explains, “[T]he American courts over the last
fifty years have ‘discovered’ to be implied by the Constitution a num-
ber of basic personal positive liberties, or substantive due process
rights, neither enumerated in the Constitution nor traditionally recog-
nized by the people, but rationally implied by the concept of equal
liberty as developed in contemporary liberal theory.”89  These include,
for example, “marital privacy rights, reproductive rights, and abortion
rights.”90
The problem is that, while these decisions have arguably resulted in
favorable outcomes for various individuals and groups, the path the
Court took to get there is paved with fictional legal doctrines that
have weakened citizen participation in democracy.  In fact, “the con-
cept of implied constitutional substantive due process rights identifi-
able and enforceable by the judiciary, more than any other, has
undermined the ability of contemporary liberalism to secure the con-
sent of the people and thus to ensure its own legitimacy as a governing
ideal.”91
85. Id. at 57.
86. Keyes, supra note 67, at 56; see also John Stuart Mill, UTILITARIANISM (1859), reprinted in
UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, ESSAY ON BENTHEM 126, 129–30 (Mary Warnock ed., 1962).
87. Keyes, supra note 67, at 59.
88. Id. at 61.
89. Id. at 57.
90. Id. at 57–58 (footnotes omitted).
91. Id. at 58.
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C. Pragmatic Democracy and the Countermajoritarian Problem
“Democracy is difficult to define, not only because it is vague . . .
but more importantly, because what one person would regard as a
paradigm case another would deny was a democracy at all.”92  The
common understanding of the word democracy is “government by the
people,”93 but this definition is riddled with ambiguities and uncer-
tainties.  Professor Spencer Overton states as follows:
In a politically diverse society, no single, universally accepted un-
derstanding of democracy exists.  Some individuals harbor demo-
cratic ideals that focus on broad participation, and look at politics as
an inclusive, deliberative process in which actors are largely moti-
vated by the public good.  Others view democracy as a competitive,
self-serving system in which private interests attempt to use govern-
ment action to maximize their private gain and government officials
make decisions in an attempt to maintain power.  Conceptions of
democracy often purport to answer certain questions about democ-
racy: What is the relationship between citizens and representatives,
majorities and minorities, and public and private interests?  Who
should be included in the process, and what efforts should be made
to include them?  Who is competent and trustworthy to make cer-
tain decisions?94
One view defines democracy “as ‘political, social and economic
equality,’ while another refers to ‘a state of society characterized by
tolerance toward minorities, freedom of expression, and respect for
the essential dignity and worth of the human individual with equal
opportunity for each to develop freely his fullest capacity in a cooper-
ative community.’”95  Furthermore, “[c]ontextual assumptions about
how politics really works or should work not only influence substan-
tive determinations about democracy, such as whether a particular ap-
portionment plan or campaign finance restriction promotes or
diminishes effective participation in representative government, but
they also affect decisions regarding the appropriate jurisdictional roles
of political actors.”96  This leads to various formulations of democracy
that are “abundant with meaning and emotive power, and at the same
time[,] verging on meaninglessness.”97  A common theme, however,
focuses on equal access to the democratic process.
92. Allan Ides, The American Democracy and Judicial Review, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991)
(quoting THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 338 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 600 (1981)).
94. Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy,
37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 84 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
95. Ides, supra note 92, at 2 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 600
(1981)).
96. Overton, supra note 94, at 85.
97. Ides, supra note 92, at 2.
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1. Democracy as a Guarantor of Equality
“The classic example of participatory democracy ostensibly oc-
curred with the rise of the ancient city-states of Greece, particularly
Athens.”98  Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s vision of democracy was also
based upon “full participation by individuals in the process of
government.”99
Of course, democracy “is more than a method for enacting laws,”100
but instead “contributes to personal and communal realization”101 on
issues related to liberty and self-governance.
Participation in the process of government uplifts the participants in
their knowledge and sensitivity to the needs of others, enhances
their sense of mature responsibility, and fully integrates each indi-
vidual into the community.  The requirements of democratic coop-
eration force the individual to take into account “wider matters
than his own immediate private interests.”102
Indeed, “an idealized version of the self-contained city-state remains
the apotheosis of a participatory democracy.”103
2. The Courts or the People as Guardians of Liberty and Equality?
A substantial part of the current debate among constitutional schol-
ars, quite frankly, is whether democracy is a good thing, or whether
courts should be the primary protector, expander, and identifier of
individual rights.  Dean and Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, for exam-
ple, believes that “[t]he Constitution purposely is an antimajoritarian
document reflecting a distrust of government conducted entirely by
majority rule.”104  Along with contemporary liberal theorists, Chemer-
insky argues that the Constitution itself is antidemocratic, and reflects
the concern that “pure democracy is . . . an invitation to tyranny.”105
Accordingly, democracy not only sets forth limits on governmental
power, but “protects substantive values from majoritarian pres-
sures.”106  Moreover, Chemerinsky views judicial review as “en-
hanc[ing] democracy by safeguarding these values.”107
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 25 (1970)).
103. Ides, supra note 92, at 5.
104. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1987).
105. Ides, supra note 92, at 20.
106. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, at 2.
107. Id.
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As such, democracy must be contained within a structure of “gov-
ernment designed to limit the perceived dangers of broad-based citi-
zen participation.”108  Chemerinsky also asserts that majority rule
must “operate within a structural framework that promotes tolerance
for minorities, freedom of expression and respect for the worth and
dignity of the individual.”109  To realize this vision,
our society should be governed by a constitution, that . . . evolve[s]
over time through means other than amendment and [should recog-
nize] that the judiciary is the ideal governmental body to implement
that evolution.  The reason given at every step of the analysis de-
rives in some manner from a fear of democratic tyranny and a faith
in centralized judicial authority.110
In other words, courts should not focus primarily on facilitating demo-
cratic governance, but instead on protecting the unidentified “substan-
tive values and procedures that society is unwilling to sacrifice to
majoritarian preferences.”111
Furthermore, since the Constitution is “sufficiently abstract,”112 it
“must be free to adapt to current circumstances”113 if it is to protect
these values and promote social unification.  Judicial review is the
“structural device designed to undermine those aspects of majority
rule seen as inimical to transcendent ‘democratic’ values.”114  Under
this view, “once one concludes that an evolving constitution is a good
thing, the legitimacy of judicial review is easily established”115 because
it can “best enforce the Constitution against the desires of political
majorities.”116  This approach, however, sanctions a system where
“[t]he antimajoritarian values of the Constitution are best protected
by a nonmajoritarian institution.”117  It also “ignores completely the
participatory theory of democracy and any potential values inherent
in a system of government more closely aligned with that theory.”118
In effect, Chemerinsky’s philosophy endorses a “discourse of
unity,”119 which maintains that robust judicial review is compatible
108. Id.
109. Ides, supra note 92, at 20 (citing CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, at 7).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 20.
115. Ides, supra note 92, at 21.
116. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, at 86.
117. Ides, supra note 92, at 21.
118. Id. at 20.
119. Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitu-
tional Democracy and the Project of Political Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371, 386
(2012).
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with democracy.  Supporters of this theory believe that democratic
governance and judicial review can have a harmonious, even comple-
mentary, relationship.120  The theory encompasses those who believe
that there is no “tension between constitutionalism and democracy”121
and those who acknowledge tension but believe it can be “reconciled
through changes in the role or form of judicial review.”122
Conversely, “discourse of disunity”123 proponents argue that this at-
tempt is “doomed to failure [because it] cannot be united in a noncon-
troversial way that would grant legitimacy to the political regime and
justify the practice of judicial review.”124  Some claim that judicial re-
view is illegitimate,125 while others argue that the “irreconcilable ten-
sion . . . does not need to lead to negative practical conclusions
because judicial review can be prudentially justified.”126  As discussed
below, neither view is entirely correct.
3. Judicial Review, Individual Rights, and a Participatory
Democracy
There is nothing inherently problematic with the view that the Con-
stitution protects evolving substantive values; it becomes troublesome
when courts have the power to say what those rights are at any given
point in time.  This is particularly true when the source of those rights
is not a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution’s text, but an
extratextual focus on transcendent and unwritten values.127
Under that regime, the Constitution becomes more than a protector
of substantive values, but a guarantor of additional, albeit uncertain,
future values that, in the judiciary’s view, are consistent with contem-
porary norms.  The inherent risk here is that the judiciary no longer
acts simply as a check on arbitrary government power, but as a mod-
ern-day, nonmajoritarian, and unaccountable rights creator.  In other
words, courts enforce their interpretation of the Constitution but do
not necessarily enforce the textual limits placed on the judiciary itself.
120. Id. at 387.
121. Id. at 389.
122. Id. at 405.
123. Id. at 386.
124. Id. at 387.
125. Sultany, supra note 119, at 387.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (reaffirming
Roe v. Wade based, in part, on the right to “define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2002)
(holding that a law banning same-sex sodomy implicated “liberty of the person both in its spatial
and in its more transcendent dimensions”).
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Thus, contemporary liberalism’s answer to the dangers of majority
rule is to establish oligarchical rule.
One problem with this approach, however, is that it fails to define
majority rule in a meaningful way.  While majority rule refers prima-
rily to the party in control of one or more branches of government, it
fails to appreciate the value of democratic governance in creating sub-
stantive, state-specific values.  Often, the majority in one state might
be the minority in another for legitimate reasons relating to differ-
ences in culture, values, or needs.  Within states, most citizens, de-
pending on the policy under review, are simultaneously in some
majorities and some minorities.  A group that succeeds in restricting
abortion rights, for example, might also be in the minority in a state
that permits euthanasia.
Contemporary liberal theorists do not seem to be arguing that the
group restricting abortion rights must be protected from majoritarian
tyranny.  Instead, they seem to argue that certain specific groups de-
serve special protections from the courts, regardless of whether the
Constitution supports either the asserted right or the judiciary’s role
in its establishment.128 Significantly, the fact that scholars have gone
to great lengths to discover unwritten rules and invisible mandates in
the Constitution129 suggests that they are trying to justify a vision of
democracy that is not supported by a reasonable interpretation of the
text.  Furthermore, because the Court’s decisions often apply to citi-
zens of every state, one might ask if they are truly decisions protecting
minority rights, or if the Court disregards intrastate autonomy to
achieve a result that is pragmatically justified or more to each Justice’s
liking.
Put differently, making judicial review the centerpiece of the funda-
mental rights discourse compromises the ability of each state to create
a participatory but nontyrannical majority.  This undermines procedu-
ral and substantive equality because citizens are subjugated to some-
thing far worse than majority rule: nonmajoritarian and politically
insulated judges.  After all, if the Constitution’s text cannot reasona-
bly be said to prohibit a particular law, even those that are silly and
unwise, it seems odd to say that the Court can nonetheless strike it
128. See, e.g., Keyes, supra  note 67, at 52 (stating that “it is the duty of the judiciary, operat-
ing on its independent moral authority, to discover and say what the law is and thereby freely to
implement the ‘truly democratic’ conditions of equality and basic personal liberty on behalf of
the people, regardless of the people’s own conception of the fair and rational laws most condu-
cive to a flourishing society”).
129. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION
210–11 (2008).
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down.  The practical effect is to make everyone a minority under the
artificial pretense of equality.
This paradigm represents a misguided form of pragmatism and fails
to establish any meaningful constitutional limits on judicial review.
The legitimacy of majority rule itself depends on institutional and in-
dividual realities such as the procedures governing the passage of
laws, and considerations of whether a law complies with federal and
state constitutional limits.  Certainly, courts are empowered to enforce
these limits by relying on both the text of the Constitution as well as
reasonable interpretations of its language, but they are not entitled to
create what never existed. That the Constitution itself provides a
method for changing the Constitution—that is, by amendment—illus-
trates that the Constitution does not authorize its amendment by judi-
cial fiat.
The words “reasonable interpretation” do not suggest that the
courts should be strict textualists, just as they do not imply an original-
ist perspective.  But they do suggest that courts should interpret the
words in a manner that is supported by traditional definitions and con-
temporary uses in various cultural, historical, or legislative contexts.
For example, it is one thing to say that, as society has evolved, our
understanding of the words “cruel and unusual”130 has changed.  It is
quite another, however, to say that the Bill of Rights contains unwrit-
ten penumbras justifying the independent creation of a substantive
right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.131  Evolving interpretations of the Eighth Amendment reflect
contemporary norms.  Manipulation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
text is wrong regardless of whether it happened in the eighteenth cen-
tury or in the twenty-first.
The more important question, however, is where the proper balance
lies in a Constitution that is not entirely democratic or undemocratic,
but instead “resistant as a whole to any sustained settlement of the
kind that either a demagogue or a sovereign authoritative point of
130. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
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view might try to impose.”132  Indeed, the Constitution “rarely finds
coherent expression as a whole,”133 and “attempts to construct or
reconstruct constitutional meaning . . . are frequently arguments over
precisely what constitutional ends require.”134  As discussed below,
the ends, particularly of judicial review, should be to empower citizens
within each state to be meaningful actors in governance while inde-
pendently protecting substantive rights that reasonably flow from the
Constitution’s text.  These ends are consistent with the Constitution’s
countermajoritarian element, a participatory democracy that eschews
normative judicial authority, and its “complex and skillfully contrived
blend of liberalism and democracy characterized by tension.”135  This
is not to say, of course, that because the Supreme Court is an undemo-
cratic institution its decisions necessarily lead to an undemocratic soci-
ety.  The problems result from decisions that are intended to facilitate
democracy, but that require a manipulation of, or disregard for, the
Constitution’s text.136
Contemporary liberalism rejects this view.  Instead, it seeks to give
the courts extraconstitutional authority—under an expanded interpre-
tation of Marbury v. Madison137 and theory of implied rights138—that
permits the invalidation of positive law that does not violate any rea-
sonable interpretation of the Constitution’s text.  As discussed below,
this is not remarkable in and of itself.  The results, however, tell a
problematic story, particularly because courts have accepted the invi-
tation and in many instances declined to exercise institutional re-
straint.  With respect to the Supreme Court, it has discovered
penumbras emanating from the Bill of Rights,139 invented dubious le-
gal doctrines to imply rights that are not supported by the text,140 and
132. BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION 208 (2006).
133. George Thomas, Two Cheers for Eighteenth-Century Constitutionalism in the Twenty-
First Century, 67 MD. L. REV. 222, 226 (2007).
134. Id. at 227.
135. Id. at 225.
136. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Foreword, System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 37–38 (2009) (“[I]t is a fallacy of composition to assume that if the Supreme Court is
undemocratic, then the constitutional system will be undemocratic overall. An undemocratic
Court may be necessary to produce a constitutional order that is democratic overall, because it is
needed to offset legislative failures, according to the very democratic benchmark the critics
use.”).
137. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
138. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assump-
tions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 622 (2009).
139. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
140. See, e.g., Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 917, 957 (1999) (“[It] is wrong when [the Court] use[s] judicially-concocted
doctrines like substantive due process to invalidate democratically-created laws.”).
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invoked stare decisis in an inconsistent manner.141  To be clear, even
the invention of doctrine would not be problematic if it were designed
to enhance political equality, but not as it has been used—to concen-
trate federal judicial power and expand the reach of federal regulatory
authority, two unelected monoliths.  This may be well-intentioned, but
it is antidemocratic and unconstitutional.
4. The Supreme Court’s Liberty Jurisprudence Leads to Procedural
and Substantive Inequality
Many of the Court’s “constitutional reconstructions depart signifi-
cantly from our eighteenth-century Constitution . . . [to] the near era-
sure of the Ninth Amendment, [and] in how we elect presidents.”142
These reconstructions have included reinterpretations of the Constitu-
tion’s text and have made the Court a primary “moral arbiter[ ] . . .
and the guarantor[] of social, as well as individual, justice”143 for all.
As a result, procedural equality has been compromised, as citizens are
less able to “participate equally in . . . defining their own individual
basic personal liberties.”144  It has also created a system where “princi-
ples of human liberty”145 do not embrace “concepts of democracy.”146
While this can be attributed in part to contemporary liberalism’s
focus on countermajoritarian precepts,147 it has more to do with “the
political stakes of the power of judicial review granted to life-tenured
federal judges.”148  It involves a “debate . . . about ‘the most extraordi-
narily powerful court of law the world has ever known.’”149
But this has not led to calls for more “active and constant participa-
tion . . . in the collective power of the political community,”150 or a
141. See, e.g., David L. Berland, Note, Stopping the Pendulum: Why Stare Decisis Should Con-
strain the Court from Further Modification of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 695, 700.
142. Thomas, supra note 133, at 226–27.
143. Evelyn Keyes, Two Conceptions of Judicial Integrity: Traditional and Perfectionist Ap-
proaches to Issues of Morality and Social Justice, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
233, 253–54 (2008); see also Keyes, supra note 67, at 58.
144. Keyes, supra note 67, at 58.
145. Breyer, supra note 43, at 245.
146. Id.
147. Nimer Sultany, supra note 119, at 374.
148. Id. at 383.
149. Id. (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (2d ed. 1986)).
150. Carla D. Pratt, Commentary, Taking Diversity Seriously: Affirmative Action and the
Democratic Role of Law Schools: A Response to Professor Brown, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 55, 71
(2006).
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focus on what Justice Breyer calls “active liberty.”151  As one scholar
argues, “[E]ven if everyone agrees that representative political institu-
tions suffer from ailments . . . such agreement should not lead to ex-
cluding citizens from participation and handing decision making to a
small group of judges to decide what the ailments are.”152  Par-
ticipatory democracy is not just about procedural equality; it is a sub-
stantive value that the Constitution protects, but that contemporary
liberalism—and the Court’s current majority—reject.
To be sure, the claim that the Constitution protects substantive val-
ues and natural rights that “comport with the fundamental nature of
human beings”153 is not controversial.  Furthermore, we do not live in
a solely procedural democracy that allows for “no constitutional limits
on legislation and [accepts] whatever a majority (or other plurality)
enacts . . . provided the appropriate procedures . . . are followed.”154
Thomas Jefferson, for example, “spoke of natural rights as limiting
what any generation acting as popular sovereign can do,”155 and
James Madison, while insisting that the “people are the best protec-
tors of their rights,”156 rejected the claim that the “majority is the po-
litical standard of right and wrong.”157  In this way, “they tended to
draw on a combination of popular sovereignty and natural rights.”158
Additionally, the Bill of Rights unquestionably protects fundamental
liberties such as speech, autonomy, and, in certain contexts, privacy.159
Thus, judicial review is not ipso facto illegitimate.  Courts should
play an important role in democratic governance because, as philoso-
pher John Rawls stated, substantive values and “freedoms [are] inter-
preted by the courts as constitutional limits on legislation.”160  But it is
one thing to enforce constitutional limits, and quite another to create
new restraints by inference, whether through penumbras or invented
legal doctrines.  When the Court tries to import specificity to the text’s
generalized language and discovers additional meanings or implied
“rights” that the text cannot reasonably support, it is no longer apply-
ing legal rules or canons of construction.  It is making a normative
151. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5
(2005).
152. Sultany, supra note 119, at 422.
153. Id. at 232–33.
154. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 145 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
155. Thomas, supra note 133, at 232.
156. Id.
157. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Oct. 5, 1786), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 27, 28 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2006).
158. Thomas, supra note 133, at 232.
159. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV.
160. RAWLS, supra note 154, at 145.
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judgment about words, such as liberty, that cannot be defined, and a
statement about values that people have a right to define for them-
selves. Facilitating an egalitarian democracy in which citizens can
make these choices and have more than a symbolic vote at the ballot
box would allow the people to “maintain for themselves, as free and
equal citizens, a social compact of ordered liberties.”161
So far, the Court’s pragmatism, while leading to favorable and
sometimes justifiable outcomes for underrepresented groups, has pre-
vented citizens from participating equally and actively in the demo-
cratic process.  Its decisions have focused too much on equality and
liberty as outcome-based goals, rather than process-oriented impera-
tives.  Ironically, the Court’s invocation of equality and liberty as a
normative justification has, in fact, resulted in less equality, greater
concentration of wealth and power, and the compromise of each per-
son’s natural right to self-determination.
Put differently, the Court should not use the “coercive power of the
law”162 to make normative judgments about the “fundamental com-
mitments of the political community.”163  To create a truer form of
liberty, the Court must facilitate a democratic process whereby the
participants are equal and citizens have meaningful “ways in which . . .
[to] discuss constitutional essentials through formal democratic chan-
nels.”164  Of course, while “it is part and parcel of the meaning of de-
mocracy to constrain . . . the dominant morality of majorities,”165 the
Court must also ensure the political equality of individual citizens.
Additionally, while part of the Court’s “essentially democratic
task”166 is to constrain legislative bodies, it is for the purpose of ensur-
ing “informed and free participation of citizens”167 and not to give the
judiciary plenary power.  Thus, instead of “settling disputes about
rights, justice, and democracy,”168 the Court should allow rights to
evolve through political decision-making processes “in which all citi-
zens can freely participate in the deliberative process.”169  As Rous-
seau stated, “If . . . the people simply promise[ ] to obey, it dissolves
itself by that act and loses its character as a people; the moment there
is a master, there is no longer a sovereign, and forthwith the body
161. Keyes, supra note 67, at 56.
162. Sultany, supra note 119, at 393–94.
163. Id. at 394.
164. Id. at 392.
165. Id. at 394.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 393.
168. Sultany, supra note 119, at 423.
169. John J. Worley, Deliberative Constitutionalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 431, 446 (2009).
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politic is destroyed.”170  Indeed, “to vest authority in any one body to
‘speak’ for the fundamental law is effectively to make that body
sovereign.”171
Of course, contemporary society will never achieve a truly par-
ticipatory democracy.  As one scholar explains, “Whether the pure
model of participatory democracy can be translated into larger gov-
ernmental units is problematical at best.”172 John Stuart Mill also rec-
ognizes that “although participation [is] the ideal, it [is] not practical
in anything but the smallest town.”173 Furthermore, while
“[r]epresentative democracy is a species of participatory democracy to
the extent that the representatives . . . reflect directly the will of their
constituents,”174 even this system is viewed as a “theoretical ideal,
unattainable in the modern, highly populated, transnational world.”175
Even in contemporary politics, however, the Court’s decisions can
significantly optimize participation while also constraining state legis-
latures from acting outside of their constitutional limits.  One scholar
explains as follows:
James Wilson insisted that “revolution principles” ought to be
taught “as a principle for the constitution of the United States,” and
during the ratifying conventions he insisted that, “the truth is, that
the supreme, absolute and uncontrollable authority, remains with
the people.”  Yet Wilson insisted that this point should legitimize
the act of creating a new constitution based on the popular authority
of the people, not the states.  Indeed, at the end of his speech he
insisted that the Declaration of Independence recognized this
unalienable right of the people.  He quoted the second paragraph of
the Declaration, emphasizing that consent legitimizes power be-
cause it obligates government to recognize unalienable rights—that
is, unalienable individual rights, which are the basis of the right of
self-government.176
These rights depend on “democratization of the corporate or indus-
trial sector”177 and “increasing opportunities for full participation in
170. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT; AND, THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 149, 170 (Susan Dunn ed. & trans., Yale
Univ. Press 2002).
171. Thomas, supra note 133, at 225.
172. Ides, supra note 92, at 5.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 6.
176. George Thomas, supra note 133, at 231–32 (footnotes omitted) (quoting James Wilson,
Lectures on Law Delivered in the College of Philadelphia (1790), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 69, 78–79 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967), and James Wilson, Speech to the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITU-
TION 61, 62 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
177. Ides, supra note 92, at 6.
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decentralized units of government.”178  This gives participants greater
personal autonomy and has a “strong potential for dismantling severe
economic disparities which may be inconsistent with the political
equality necessary for a legitimate participatory democracy.”179  As
Professors Stone, Seidman, Sunstein, and Tushnet explain, “Dialogue
and discussion among the citizenry were [historically] critical features
in the governmental process.”180  Moreover, “[p]olitical participation
should be active and frequent and not limited to voting or other simi-
lar statements of preference.”181
As former United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo
stated, “[T]he juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the
philosophy of pragmatism.”182  Since “truth is relative, not abso-
lute,”183 and the Constitution accommodates “the particular people it
is created for,”184 then they must have a more influential role in a
changing society.  As one scholar explains, “The challenge therefore is
to counteract antidemocratic sentiments and help citizens to develop
and cultivate attitudes and values that strengthen democracy.”185  Af-
ter all, as another commentator explains, “citizens unable to hold their
leaders accountable collapse into a mood of indifference.”186
Ultimately, pragmatism that “protect[s] ‘higher law [with] . . . deci-
sions that reasonably accord with the constitution itself’”187 and en-
ables a participatory democracy will lead to a more equal Constitution
that respects diverse understandings of liberty.  An examination of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence across the constitutional spectrum,
however, shows how separate and unequal the Constitution has
become.
III. TODAY’S SEPARATE BUT UNEQUAL CONSTITUTIONS
In Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely stated that “when the
Constitution is viewed as a whole, its primary concern is not enshrin-
ing substantive rights, but creating a system that encourages represen-
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (1986).
181. Id.
182. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102 (1921).
183. Id.
184. Thomas, supra note 133, at 236.
185. Okechukwu Oko, The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Africa, 43 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 165, 205 (2009).
186. Id. at 204.
187. Sultany, supra note 119, at 392 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 234 (ex-
panded ed. Columbia Univ. Press 2005) (1993)).
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tative democracy.”188  The Court’s jurisprudence, for the most part,
has undermined equality and liberty in the political and democratic
processes.  While the cases below are merely a sample, they are repre-
sentative of a jurisprudence, within and across the individual rights’
amendments, that devalues equal participation.
A. The Goldman Sachs Constitution
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,189 the Court
missed an opportunity to increase citizen participation in the electoral
process.
1. The Decision
The Court struck down § 441(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2002 (BCRA), which prohibited corporations and unions
from using general treasury funds that “expressly advocate[ed] the
election or defeat of a candidate . . . and [were] publicly distributed . . .
within [thirty] days of a primary election.”190  The limitations on cor-
porate and union contributions, which applied to direct or individual
expenditures (electioneering communications), were challenged on
the ground that they violated the First Amendment.191
The Court agreed with this argument, holding that the BCRA “nec-
essarily reduce[d] the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of issues discussed . . . and the size of the audience reached.”192  As a
result, the BCRA “silenc[ed] certain voices . . . [at] various points in
the speech process” that “the government deem[ed] to be suspect,”
compromising “an essential mechanism of democracy.”193  As one
scholar explains, the Court used highly critical language, holding that
the restriction is a “ban on speech”194 which infringed “[t]he right of
citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach
188. Evan Barret Smith, Representation Reinforcement Revisited: Citizens United and Political
Process Theory, 38 VT. L. REV. 445, 447–48 (2013).
189. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
190. Id. at 320–21; see also 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A), 441b (2008); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(2)
(2008).  The statute also prohibited expenditures within sixty days of a general election.  2 U.S.C.
§ 434(f)(3)(A).
191. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339.
192. Id. at 339 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1975) (per curiam)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
193. Id.
194. Paul Weitzel, Protecting Citizens from the Heart: How Citizens United Strikes Down Po-
litical Speech Restrictions on Churches and Charities, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 155, 163 (2011)
(quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337); see also Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the
Ineluctable Question of Corporate Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575, 581 (2012).
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consensus,” and this right “is a precondition to enlightened self-
government.”195
While purporting to enhance democracy, the Court’s decision did
the opposite because it prevented the government from increasing
equality in the political process.  While the Court acknowledged that
preventing corruption in the political process was a compelling gov-
ernment interest, it applied that principle to “quid pro quo corrup-
tion”196 rather than a broader, more systemic corruption.  This unduly
narrow approach led to a superficial and unrealistic assessment of the
pervasive inequalities in national elections.197
Justice Stevens vigorously dissented, recognizing that “the distinc-
tion between corporate and human speakers is significant,”198 and that
that the “financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orienta-
tion of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the
electoral process.”199  As such, “lawmakers have a compelling consti-
tutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed
to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spend-
ing in local and national races.”200
Justice Stevens criticized the Court’s ruling, arguing that it “threat-
ens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Na-
tion”201 and “do damage to this institution.”202  Even though the
Court had previously recognized the “distinction between corporate
and individual campaign spending,” in Austin v. Michigan State Cham-
ber of Commerce,203 it made no attempt to explain why that holding
was no longer controlling.204  Additionally, although the Court had
allowed states to prohibit corporations from using treasury money to
make independent expenditures in McConnell v. FEC,205 it departed
from these principles without any plausible explanation.
195. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339.
196. Id. at 345.
197. See James A. Gardner, The Incompatible Treatment of Majorities in Election Law and
Deliberative Democracy, 12 ELECTION L.J. 468, 477 (2013) (“Because most public political
speech in the United States is generated privately and disseminated with privately held re-
sources, the institution of campaign speech is built on, and inevitably reproduces, underlying ine-
qualities in the distribution of resources, biasing it in favor of the rich.”).
198. Citizens United, 538 U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 396.
202. Id.
203. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
204. Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 395 (citing Austin, 494 U.S. 652).
205. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 588 U.S. 310.
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The Court’s central argument for why stare decisis ought to be
trumped is that it does not like Austin. . . .
. . . The Court proclaims that “Austin is undermined by experi-
ence since its announcement.”  This is a curious claim to make in a
case that lacks a developed record.  The majority has no empirical
evidence with which to substantiate the claim; we just have its ipse
dixit that the real world has not been kind to Austin. Nor does the
majority bother to specify in what sense Austin has been “under-
mined.” Instead it treats the reader to a string of non sequiturs:
“Our Nation’s speech dynamic is changing[;]” “[s]peakers have be-
come adept at presenting citizens with sound bites, talking points,
and scripted messages[;]” “[c]orporations . . . do not have mono-
lithic views[.]” How any of these ruminations weakens the force of
stare decisis escapes my comprehension.206
In fact, Justice Stevens went so far as to say that the Court’s rejec-
tion of precedent “comes down to nothing more than its disagreement
with their results,”207 and is an “amalgamation of resuscitated dissents
from those cases.”208  Indeed, the “only relevant thing that has
changed since Austin and McConnell is the composition of this
Court,”209 which caused Justice Stevens to remind the Court of the
importance of adhering to rules that it has “developed . . . for its own
governance.”210
2. The Impact on Democracy
Citizens United damaged procedural and substantive equality in the
political process. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was based, in
part, on a fundamental misconception about the dangers of money as
a proxy for access: “[A] substantial and legitimate reason, if not the
only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candi-
date over another is that the candidate will respond by producing
those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised
on responsiveness.”211  In other words, if representatives give the ap-
pearance of being responsive by giving influence or access, this “will
not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy” because seek-
206. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 409–10 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(second and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 414.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 395 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)
(Braneis, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Id. at 359 (majority opinion)  (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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ing favor with elected officials is an understood premise and an una-
voidable aspect of our democracy.212
Justice Kennedy is dead wrong.  Citizens become disillusioned with
democracy when access and responsiveness are largely influenced by
money.  This favors the wealthy and reduces voting to little more than
a symbolic gesture.  That is a recipe for procedural and substantive
inequality because it makes politicians accountable to the individuals
and groups who fund their campaigns, and to the views they cham-
pion. One commentator explains as follows:
An equality rationale undergirds Justice Stevens’s reference to
power and competitiveness . . . . Justice Stevens worried about what
corruption of the democratic process would lead to because citizens
“may lose faith in their capacity, as citizens, to influence public pol-
icy. . . . The predictable result is cynicism and disenchantment: an
increased perception that large spenders ‘call the tune’ and a re-
duced ‘willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance.”’213
Lawrence Lessig “refers to the Court’s factual claim[ ] . . . [that]
‘[t]he appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the electo-
rate to lose faith in our democracy’ as blind Lochnerisms.”214  Indeed,
as Michael Waldman states, “[T]he ruling points toward a truly dys-
topian future, when candidates, campaigns, and parties are drowned
out by special interest funding as loud as it is stealthy.”215  The late
Ronald Dworkin compared “political advertising to beer [ads, arguing
that] they threaten the integrity of political debate.”216  The result is a
system where access is predicated largely on money.
This is not to say that Citizens United was wrongly decided as a
matter of strict constitutional law.  The truth is that there is no objec-
tively correct answer.  What matters is that Citizens United was wrong
for a country that values equality above status.  A pragmatic decision
would have upheld the statute and “strengthen[ed] the democratic
process” by using a “participation-oriented, representation-reinforc-
212. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359–60 (majority opinion).
213. Smith, supra note 188, at 454 (alteration in original) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at
144).
214. Id. at 455 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
314).
215. Id. (quoting Michael Waldman, Supreme Court’s Citizens United Decision Will Warp
Policymaking, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 27, 2010, 2:13 PM), http://www.usnews.com/
opinion/articles/2010/09/27/supreme-courts-citizens-united-decision-will-warp-policymaking) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
216. Id. at 454 (citing Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, May 13, 2010, at 63, 64, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/
13/decision-threatens-democracy/).
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ing approach to judicial review.”217  As John Hart Ely explains in De-
mocracy and Distrust, this promotes equal access to, not equal
outcomes in, the election and lawmaking process:
[Ely] argues that judges should abandon the search for appropriate
values and instead “ensure that the political process—which is
where such values are properly identified, weighed, and accommo-
dated—[is] open to those of all viewpoints on something approach-
ing an equal basis. . . . Ely’s approach attempts to offer a solution to
Bickel’s “[c]ounter-[m]ajoritarian [d]ifficulty,” by arguing that rep-
resentation-reinforcing judges are not Platonic guardians but are
simply acting as referees by “[c]learing the [c]hannels of [p]olitical
[c]hange.”  He likens his approach to an antitrust rather than a
traditional regulatory approach—only intervening when necessary
to break up a political situation approaching an oligarchy.218
As Ely recognized, “money can distort the utilitarian basis for ma-
joritarianism,”219 which is, among other things, to ensure that “minori-
ties have the opportunity for ‘wheeling and dealing”’ and are not
being “barred from the pluralist’s bazaar.”220
Thus, while the judiciary should intervene when the “political mar-
ket . . . is systematically malfunctioning,”221 it should be for the pur-
pose of enhancing democratic liberty and not for the purpose of
creating a wealth-driven electoral process.  The Court’s decision in
Citizens United made state legislators less accountable to the voters
because citizens lost both political capital at the ballot box and signifi-
cant value as participants in lawmaking.
B. The Gridlocked Constitution
In Clinton v. City of New York,222 the Court blocked the coordinate
branches’ efforts to reduce excessive spending and thereby balance
the federal budget.223
217. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87
(1980).
218. Smith, supra note 188, at 448 (alterations in original) (quoting ELY, supra note 217, at 71,
74, 105) (footnotes omitted).
219. Id. at 463.
220. Id. at 463 (quoting ELY, supra note 217, at 151–52).
221. Alan M. Dershowitz, Tribute, John Hart Ely: Constitutional Scholar (A Skeptic’s Perspec-
tive on Original Intent as Reinforced by the Writings of John Hart Ely), 40 STAN. L. REV. 360, 362
(1988).
222. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
223. Id. at 423, 449.
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1. The Decision
In Clinton, both houses of Congress passed, and the President
signed, the Line Item Veto Act (Veto Act).224  It allowed the Presi-
dent to veto or “cancel in whole” three categories of spending that
were previously signed into law and included in duly-passed legisla-
tion.225  Before vetoing a spending provision, however, the President
was required to consider its legislative history and determine that the
veto contributed to reducing the federal budget deficit.226 Further-
more, a “lockbox” provision required that monies saved by the veto
would not be spent elsewhere.227  Congress also had the option to pass
a “disapproval bill” that would invalidate the President’s veto.228
Elevating “form over substance,”229 the Court held that the Veto
Act violated article 1, section 7 (the Presentment Clause) of the Con-
stitution.230  Justice Kennedy concurred, stating that the line item veto
violated the nondelegation doctrine.231  The majority acknowledged
that “both major political parties . . . in the Legislative and Executive
Branches have long advocated for the enactment of such proce-
dures”232 to ensure fiscal accountability.  In its view, however, the line
item veto allowed the President to create “a different law”233 than
that which was enacted, thus violating the Constitution’s “finely
wrought” procedures.234
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy argued that the line item veto
violated separation of powers principles by “concentrat[ing] power in
a single branch.”235  This constituted a “threat to liberty”236 that “tran-
224. Id. at 420–21.
225. Id. at 436 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (1996)).
226. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 691(b)).
227. Id. at 440–41.
228. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436–37 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)).
229. Eric Stephen Schmitt, Note, There Is No Joy in D.C., The Mighty Court Struck Out: An
Analysis of Clinton v. City of New York, The Line Item Veto Act and the Court’s Failure To
Uphold Constitutionally Legitimate Means to a Viable End, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 167, 190 (2000).
230. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421.
231. Id. at 449, 451–52 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Con-
gress from delegating legislative power to another branch of government.  Congress may, how-
ever, delegate power to another branch or agency to enforce duly enacted legislation or broad
policy directives. See, e.g., Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“So long as Congress ‘shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to
[exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbid-
den delegation of legislative power.’”) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
232. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 447 (majority opinion).
233. Id. at 448.
234. Id. at 447 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
235. Id. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
236. Id.
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scend[ed] the convenience of the moment.”237  In Justice Kennedy’s
view, liberty is threatened “in a real sense”238 if one branch is “not
subject to traditional constitutional constraints.”239
2. The Impact on Democracy
The Court’s decision in Clinton prevented democracy from operat-
ing more efficiently for the people.  Justice Breyer, in a dissent joined
by Justices Scalia and O’Connor, argued that the Constitution permits
the government to enact legislation in response to contemporary
problems. Justice Breyer relied upon the “genius of the Framers’ prag-
matic vision, which this Court has long recognized in cases that find
constitutional room for necessary institutional innovation.”240 One
commentator described Justice Breyer’s dissent as follows:
The real issue, Breyer felt, was whether Congress could choose to
create a contemporary solution (a line item veto) for a problem that
did not exist in 1776. Breyer maintained that the Court’s previous
holdings permitted interdependence and flexible relations between
two branches of government in order to secure a “workable govern-
ment.”  Breyer quoted Justice Marshall in support of the functional
notion that as the times and circumstances change, so may the mea-
sures a government adopts to remedy such circumstances.241
Justice Breyer also argued that “the [Veto Act] does not violate any
specific textual constitutional command, nor does it violate any im-
plicit separation-of-powers principle.”242
The Court’s decision undermined procedural and substantive equal-
ity because it thwarted the government’s collective effort to alleviate
the effects of excessive spending and partisan politics.  The line item
veto addressed a “contemporary problem associated with modern-day
democracy in America without frustrating or compromising hallowed
Separation of Powers goals.”243
Tolerance for government flexibility and innovation is a hallmark of
democracy. The [Veto Act] was not inconsistent with the goals of
the Separation of Powers doctrine. The President was acting in an
executive role and still had no formal function in the legislative pro-
cess.  Some amount of executive discretion should be allowed.  In
fact, historical evidence shows the Framers may have even believed
237. Id. at 449.
238. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 451.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 472 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
241. Schmitt, supra note 229, at 182 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 472).
242. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 469–70.
243. Schmitt, supra note 229, at 189.
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that congressional appropriations were considered permissive and
not required.
Part of the genius of the Constitution is its pragmatic vision and
“room for necessary institutional innovation.”  The government
must be allowed to delegate authority to those most apt to handle
particular problems or policies.244
The Court gave little deference to the Veto Act’s democratic ends
because it was “so concerned with the apparent textual ramifications
of the [Veto Act] and its title that it failed to give proper context to a
congressional attempt to . . . restore the balance of power the Found-
ing Fathers envisioned.”245
Furthermore, as in Citizens United, the Constitution did not compel
the Court’s holding. As one commentator explains, “[T]here is very
little difference between the procedures prescribed by the [Veto Act]
and traditional congressional authorization of dollars to be spent on a
particular item at the President’s discretion.”246  In fact, “the majority
would have likely viewed the law differently if it were instead named
the ‘Decline to Spend Act of 1996,’”247 because “Congress has been
letting presidents ‘decline to spend’ for two hundred years and the
Court has endorsed these and other bold delegations of power.”248
Apparently, “semantics and a fear of a campaign pledge effectively
scared the Court away from allowing a novel experiment,”249 even
though “the [Veto Act] expressly comported with the Constitution in
an attempt to reform many of the indulgences of modern-day ‘logroll-
ing.’”250  At its core, Clinton was countermajoritarian in a most un-
democratic sense.
C. The Third Political Branch Constitution
1. The Decision
Democracy took a direct hit during the 2000 Presidential election,
when the judiciary had the final word in deciding whether George W.
Bush or Al Gore would become the forty-third President of the
United States. In Bush v. Gore,251 the Court effectively ended the
244. Id. at 190 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 472).
245. Id. at 168–69 (footnote omitted).
246. Id. at 186.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Schmitt, supra note 229, at 188.
250. Id. See generally J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A
Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (1990).
251. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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2000 presidential recount, put to rest the “political question doctrine,”
and became the third political branch when it held that the Florida
Supreme Court’s order requiring a statewide recount of “under-votes”
violated the Equal Protection Clause.252  The order “required a man-
ual recount of approximately 42,000 . . . ballots on which automatic
machine recounts had failed to detect a vote for President and which
had not yet been manually recounted.”253  Officials were required to
“count a vote if there was a ‘clear indication of the intent of the voter’
on the ballot, unless it was ‘impossible to determine the elector’s
choice.’”254
The Court held that this scheme violated the Equal Protection
Clause.  In its per curiam opinion, the Court held that “[t]he recount
mechanisms implemented . . . [by] the Florida Supreme Court did not
satisfy the minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters
necessary to secure the fundamental right [to equal protection].”255
Specifically, the “clear intent standard in manually recounting the
under-votes would result in arbitrary and disparate treatment of vot-
ers”256 because it “lacked the specificity that would ensure its equal
application.”257  The Court cited, for example, “differences between
recounts limited to under-votes and recounts that reexamined all of
the ballots cast, and differences between tabulations based on partial
recounts versus tabulations based on completed recounts.”258
Furthermore, even if all votes were counted, an official in one
county “might count a ballot with an indentation but no separation of
the chad from the card, whereas [an official in another county] might
not count a similar indentation.”259  Thus, the Court found that “the
absence of a uniform standard to be followed in each county for the
discernment of voter intent”260 violated equal protection principles.
Consequently, because “it [was] evident that any recount seeking to
meet [a] December 12 [deadline] [would] be unconstitutional,”261 the
Court held that further remedial attempts were not possible.
252. Id. at 110–11.
253. Overton, supra note 94, at 69.
254. Id. (quoting Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526, 534 n.24 (2000)).
255. Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal
Right To Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535, 550–51 (2001) (first and
fourth alteration in original) (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105).
256. Overton, supra note 94, at 69.
257. Id. at 70.
258. Shane, supra note 255, at 552 (footnote omitted).
259. Overton, supra note 94, at 70.
260. Shane, supra note 255, at 551.
261. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110.
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2. The Impact on Democracy
The Court’s decision substituted its own judgment for that of the
state officials responsible for bringing the election to a democratic
conclusion.  It also highlighted the Justices’ differing conceptions con-
cerning democracy and citizen participation.
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas supported a “rule-like inter-
pretation, which excluded the [under-votes . . . ] consistent with a par-
ticular conception of democracy”262 that belies the fact that “the right
to vote is satisfied by the simple opportunity to follow instructions and
cast a vote.”263  Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, however, “were con-
cerned that the Court would be exceeding its role if it displaced the
[Florida Supreme Court’s] interpretation of the state statutory
scheme.”264  Thus, while Justices Kennedy and O’Connor did not sup-
port a rigid application of the rule, their enforcement of the Decem-
ber 12 deadline for selecting state electors “prevent[ed] the state court
from exercising any further discretion in counting additional
ballots.”265
Of course, rules “promote democratic stability by preventing polit-
ics from disintegrating into a confusing and endless disarray of heated
disputes, including litigation and violence.”266 Furthermore, “because
the border between law and politics is vulnerable . . . the discretion
afforded through [flexible] standards clouds the boundary by allowing
for partisanship, favoritism, arbitrariness, suspicion, distrust, and
uncertainty.”267
Strict rule application, however, can frustrate democratic processes
and devalue active citizen engagement in the political process.  As one
scholar argues, “[E]nslavement to electoral rules often leads to gross
unfairness. . .  [because r]igid rules can never anticipate all contingen-
cies, and are often used as political tools of exclusion.”268  Indeed, the
“anger, resentment, disillusionment, and frustration that result from
the unfairness of rigid rules can promote political alienation, factional-
ism, political instability, and a decline of commitment to societal mo-
res and laws generally.”269
262. Overton, supra note 94, at 90.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 91.
265. Id. at 91–92.
266. Id. at 99.
267. Id.
268. Overton, supra note 94, at 100 (footnotes omitted).
269. Id. at 100–01.
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For that reason, flexible standards that “provide preset guidelines as
to how to facilitate democracy . . . but allow decision[ ]makers to ac-
cord the political rights of each citizen individualized importance”270
help to avoid the unfairness caused by a “mindless application of
mechanical rules.”271  Put differently, the “mindless embrace of inflex-
ible electoral rules that dismiss pragmatic concerns about individual-
ized justice”272 can result in the perception that democracy is not
functioning fairly for individual citizens.
The majority’s decision made that perception a reality, and under-
scored the problem of applying fixed legal rules to a democratic prob-
lem.  In so doing, it emphasized the wrong outcome.  Arguably, the
decision was designed to “promote democratic stability by preventing
politics from disintegrating into . . . [an] endless disarray of heated
disputes,”273 but came from a federal court that had intervened in a
state-run election. And the result, quite possibly, led to some votes
not being counted.  Like Clinton and Citizens United, Bush v. Gore
was not necessarily “wrong” as a matter of constitutional law, but it
erred by prioritizing stability over democratic participation.
The point is “not that it is best to apply either rules or standards in
every situation.”274 These cases show that, for many constitutional
questions that the Court faces, there is no correct answer.  That is pre-
cisely why citizens, through their representatives, should have the au-
thority to decide these questions.
D. The Power-Hungry Constitution
Griswold v. Connecticut275 and Roe v. Wade276 are but two exam-
ples wherein the Court served as a “super legislature” to reach
favorable outcomes that had disastrous results for state autonomy and
citizen participation.  Much more than merely providing judicial re-
view, the Justices have recently embarked on a power grab of epic
proportions, enthroning themselves as the arbiters of all that is just,
moral, ethical, and American, and not just all that is unconstitutional.
270. Id. at 101.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 102.
273. Id. at 99.
274. Overton, supra note 94, at 101.
275. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
276. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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1. The Decisions
In Griswold, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that pro-
hibited the use of contraception.277  Instead of “wait[ing] for the ordi-
nary processes of democratic debate to adjust state policy, the
Supreme Court assumed the task of freeing the electorate of Connect-
icut (and America in general) from a law the dissenting Justices called
‘silly.’”278  The majority’s decision, while predicated on the Four-
teenth Amendment, was not based on a reasonable interpretation of
its text.  Instead, the Court discovered “penumbras” in the Bill of
Rights, formed by “emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance.”279
The majority held that the “[v]arious guarantees [in the Bill of
Rights] create zones of privacy,”280 and that these zones prohibit the
enactment of laws “which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.”281  For example, the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which would prohibit “the police [from searching] the sacred precincts
of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives,”282
contains an unwritten privacy right that transferred to other provi-
sions.  The Court also held that the privacy zones within the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments create an affirmative in-
dependent right to privacy.283
In his dissent, Justice Black recognized that the law, while “uncom-
monly silly,”284 was not unconstitutional:
277. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
278. Richard G. Wilkins & John Nielsen, The Question Raised by Lawrence: Marriage, the
Supreme Court and a Written Constitution, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (2007) (quoting Griswold,
381 U.S. at 527  (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
279. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (majority opinion).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
282. Id. at 484–85.
283. Id. at 484.  The Court stated as follows:
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as
we have seen.  The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of
soldiers “in any house” in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another
facet of that privacy.  The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the “right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”  The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citi-
zen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment.  The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”
Id.
284. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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I feel constrained to add that the law is every bit as offensive to me
as it is my Brethren of the majority . . . who, reciting reasons why it
is offensive to them, hold it unconstitutional. There is no single one
of the graphic and eloquent strictures and criticisms fired at the pol-
icy of this Connecticut law either by the Court’s opinion or by those
of my concurring Brethren to which I cannot subscribe—except
their conclusion that the evil qualities they see in the law make it
unconstitutional.
. . . .
The Court talks about a constitutional “right of privacy” as
though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbid-
ding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the “privacy” of
individuals.  But there is not.285
As Justice Black noted, “There are, of course, guarantees in certain
specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect
privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain activi-
ties.”286  These guarantees do not, however, create a separate and fun-
damental right to privacy.  They also risk the arbitrary exercise of
judicial power:
The due process argument which [the majority] adopt[s] here is
based, as their opinions indicate, on the premise that this Court is
vested with power to invalidate all state laws that it considers to be
arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive, or on this Court’s
belief that a particular state law under scrutiny has no “rational or
justifying” purpose, or is offensive to a “sense of fairness and jus-
tice.”  If these formulas based on “natural justice,” or others which
mean the same thing, are to prevail, they require judges to deter-
mine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own ap-
praisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary.  The power to make
such decisions is of course that of a legislative body.  Surely it has to
be admitted that no provision of the Constitution specifically gives
such blanket power to courts to exercise such a supervisory veto
over the wisdom and value of legislative policies and to hold uncon-
stitutional those laws which they believe unwise or dangerous.287
To be sure, “[o]ne of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding
a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word
or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more
or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning.”288
Justice Black also explained that, by creating an independent right
to privacy, the Court used “a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept
which can easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also, on the
other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many
285. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507–08 (Black, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 508.
287. Id. at 511–12 (footnote omitted).
288. Id. at 509.
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things.”289  Thus, while he “completely subscrib[ed] to the holding of
Marbury v. Madison,” Justice Black recognized that the Court did not
have the authority to “measure constitutionality by our belief that leg-
islation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable . . . or is offensive to
our own notions of ‘civilized standards of conduct.’”290  The Court’s
power is limited “to strik[ing] down statutes, state or federal, that vio-
late [the] commands of the Federal Constitution.”291
In Roe,292 the Court invalidated two statutes prohibiting abortion
except to save the life of the mother.  The majority once again relied
on the “penumbras of the Bill of Rights”293 to hold that “[t]his right of
privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s con-
cept of personal liberty . . . or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reserva-
tion of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision . . . to terminate her pregnancy.”294  The Court made no
others attempts to justify its decision, which one scholar called “bad
constitutional law, or rather . . . it is not constitutional law and gives
almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.”295
2. The Impact on Democracy
Griswold and Roe reached results that arguably furthered individ-
ual autonomy and liberty.  The result, however, was not based on a
reasonable construction or expansion of the Constitution’s text.  In-
stead, the Court created a new right by engrafting penumbras onto the
text of the Constitution, thus filling a logical gap in its analysis and
thereby allowing the Court to claim that the decision was based on the
text itself.  But no amount of legal gymnastics could mask a deeper
problem with the Court’s decision: it was acting in a normative and
extratextual capacity on matters of social policy.  One scholar states as
follows:
Roe forced America, and the Court, to confront whether the Con-
stitution in fact mandates judicial resolution of social controversies
precisely because they are moral, divisive, and difficult.  The legal
academy that had nurtured privacy analysis and warmly welcomed
Griswold now rushed to rewrite and re-explain the Supreme Court’s
astonishing decision. Thousands of pages in the law reviews were
dedicated to sophisticated (and often incomprehensible and contra-
289. Id.
290. Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
291. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 513.
292. 410 U.S. 113.
293. Id. at 152.
294. Id. at 153.
295. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 947 (1973).
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dictory) justifications for Roe’s elimination of democratic debate
and decision making at the very moment they were needed most.
These obviously post hoc apologetics embarrassed the Court and
for many years the Court was hesitant to lengthen the shadows of
Griswold.296
In both cases, the Court “assert[ed] its undefined and seemingly un-
limited power to define for all the fundamental rights it wishes to put
beyond the reach of democratic politics at any level of govern-
ment.”297  In so doing, the Court transformed itself into “a super-legis-
lature with the power to invalidate legislation in any manner it
wishes.”298
Normative judicial review, however, is incompatible with democ-
racy, and undermines the very principles—equality, liberty, and pri-
vacy—that its decisions claim to vindicate. Cases such as Griswold and
Roe did not actually create “rights” so much as they nationalized pol-
icy decisions based on vague principles that are incapable of precise
definition, let alone universal application.  This has led to a new type
of inequality because it gives the Court a greater and unchecked de-
gree of power to invalidate constitutional laws.  The views of each citi-
zen and the laws of each state were now subjugated to a Court that
transgressed its own limits under Article III and Marbury for the pur-
pose of imposing extra-textual constraints on democracy.  The results
in Griswold and Roe did not enhance equality.  They sacrificed liberty
to a new kind of paternalism, whereby the Court’s normative deci-
sions became the law for everyone until the Court decides to change
it.  This is the unwritten rule that emanated from these cases.  When
the Court’s “super legislation” or judicial activism comports with
one’s own preferences, it is seductive to support the Court’s legislative
power grab.  But one would be well-counseled to remember that the
makeup of the Court changes regularly over time, so although one
may now bask in the glow of the Court’s activism, one may soon find
that the Court’s activism is diametrically opposed to one’s prefer-
ences.  What then?
E. The Anemic Constitution
The Court’s jurisprudence in other contexts tells a very different
story, but with similar results.  In the context of Sixth Amendment,
the Court has shown extraordinary deference to the states and given
296. Wilkins & Nielsen, supra note 278, at 1407 (footnotes omitted).
297. Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 597, 612 (2013).
298. Id.
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no substance to the fundamental right to counsel.299  In Gideon v.
Wainwright,300 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment, as made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires
that counsel be appointed for indigent defendants.301  That right, how-
ever, has never been realized.  The Court’s Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence in this regard has been anemic.
1. The Decisions
In Strickland v. Washington,302 the Court created a two-pronged
standard for governing ineffective assistance of counsel that would
prove nearly impossible to satisfy.  The Court held that “[f]irst, the
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,”303
and second, that “the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.”304
To satisfy the first prong, the defendant is required to show that
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasona-
bleness.”305  The Court explained, however, that “[j]udicial scrutiny of
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,”306 stating as
follows:
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to recon-
struct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.  Be-
cause of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,
the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the cir-
cumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy.307
Furthermore, counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered ade-
quate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment.”308
299. See Adam Lamparello, Establishing Guidelines for Attorney Representation of Criminal
Defendants at the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 62 ME. L. REV. 97, 151–53 (2010).
300. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
301. Id. at 343–44.
302. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
303. Id. at 687.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 688.
306. Id. at 689.
307. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
308. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
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The second prong establishes that even if the attorney’s perform-
ance is “professionally unreasonable,”309 it does not support vacating
the conviction if “the error [has] no effect on the judgment.”310  In
other words, “the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure
that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the
outcome of the proceeding”311 and that “any deficiencies in counsel’s
performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute
ineffective assistance under the Constitution.”312  Thus, even if “par-
ticular errors of counsel were unreasonable . . . the defendant must
show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense.”313  The
Court defined this as a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”314
This standard became the vehicle through which horribly inade-
quate legal representation would be tolerated, and it left indigent de-
fendants with no constitutional remedy for terribly inadequate legal
representation.  Indeed, the standard “proved virtually impossible for
defendants to meet, and instead of raising the bar for effective coun-
sel, the Court created a bar to nearly all assertions of attorney inade-
quacy.”315  In fact, for sixteen years after Strickland was decided, “the
Supreme Court itself failed to find a single instance of constitutionally
inadequate representation.”316
Incredibly, “[e]ven in capital cases, where life and death literally
hung in the balance, courts often deferred to incomprehensible ‘stra-
tegic’ decisions provided by trial counsel rationalizing their slothful
representation.”317
Lawyers have been found to be drunk or drugged, mentally ill, or
asleep while representing a defendant. In addition, several recent
studies of capital trials reveal that lawyers who represented death
row inmates at trial were subsequently disbarred, suspended, or oth-
erwise disciplined at a rate three to forty-six times the average for
the relevant states. . . . For those attorneys whose clients were exe-
309. Id. at 691.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 691–92.
312. Id. at 692.
313. Id. at 693.
314. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
315. John H. Blume & Stacy Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Tay-
lor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 134 (2007).
316. Id. at 134.
317. Id. at 142.
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cuted, the rate of disciplinary sanctions was almost forty times that
of the bar as a whole.318
This has led to gross inequality in the criminal justice process.  In
capital cases, for example, defendants have been represented by attor-
neys who are “not even aware that a separate sentencing proceeding
would be held in a capital case”319 or had “never tried a case to a jury
before.”320  Similarly, courts have upheld convictions where one attor-
ney had been “the subject of disciplinary proceedings” and another
“virtually incapacitated”321
Furthermore, the scarce resources allocated to public defenders in
some jurisdictions almost ensure that representation there will be in-
adequate.  To begin with, public defenders are “underpaid and over-
worked”322 and “ration their services to the most needy clients.”323
Moreover, some indigent defendants are either deprived of counsel
entirely or shuffled through the criminal justice system without any
meaningful examination of their case.  Professor Stephen Bright ex-
plains as follows:
An [American Bar Association] report in 2004 reached “the dis-
turbing conclusion that thousands of persons are processed through
America’s courts every year either with no lawyer at all or with a
lawyer who does not have the time, resources, or in some cases the
inclination to provide effective representation.”  A national study in
2009 found that in misdemeanor cases—which far outnumber felo-
nies and which affect millions of people—judges were encouraging
defendants to plead guilty without counsel, prosecutors were talking
directly with defendants and convincing them to plead guilty with-
out counsel, defendants were discouraged from asking for counsel
because of application fees for a public defender as high as $200,
and defense lawyers usually had too many cases to provide compe-
tent representation.324
318. Galia Benson-Amram, Protecting the Integrity of the Court: Trial Court Responsibility for
Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 425, 431–33 (2004).
319. Id. at 433.
320. Id. at 434.
321. Lamparello, supra note 299, at 117 (quoting Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 304 (2d
Cir. 1992) (en banc)).
322. Krista M. Anderson, Twelve Years Post Morrison: State Civil Remedies and a Proposed
Government Subsidy To Incentivize Claims by Rape Survivors, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 223,
253 (2013).
323. Allison D. Kuhns, Note, If You Cannot Afford an Attorney, Will One Be Appointed for
You?: How (Some) States Force Criminal Defendants To Choose Between Posting Bond and
Getting a Court-Appointed Attorney, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1798 (2012).
324. Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon
v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2162–63 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (quoting STANDING
COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, A.B.A., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE:
AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, at iv (2004), available at http://
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As Professor Bright explains, “[M]ost state governments have
treated the Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon not as a bright star
pointing the way to justice, but as an unfunded mandate to be re-
sisted.”325  The ABA report quoted by Professor Bright “makes clear
that to go from the pretense of representation to the reality of it, there
must be a new commitment to counsel and equal justice,”326 which
“will occur only when courts begin enforcing the right to counsel, in-
stead of being complicit in its denial.”327
2. The Impact on Democracy
The Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence makes one question its
commitment to liberty and equality.  Even in capital cases, the Court
has turned a blind eye to shocking examples of incompetent represen-
tation, mostly due to a legal standard that few individuals could sat-
isfy. This has made the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel more
abstract than real, and has led to procedural and substantive inequal-
ity.  It is not unfathomable, and is perhaps almost certain, that indi-
gent defendants have been wrongly convicted—and, in some cases,
sentenced to death—because of inadequate legal representation.328
This approach, and the deference given to states, stands in stark
contrast to the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, in
which liberty and privacy have been treated as sacrosanct.  In the
Sixth Amendment context, where liberty and sometimes life are at
stake, the Court has allowed states to woefully underfund their public
defender programs and effectively ignore the Gideon mandate.  The
Court’s failure to find a single instance of inadequate representation
over a sixteen-year period has resulted in the actual deprivation of life
and liberty.
Democracy has also suffered.  The European Court of Human
Rights, for example, has explained “that the European Convention
[on Human Rights] is intended to provide practical rights, and . . .
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls
_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf).
325. Id. at 2174.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Rebecca Copeland, Getting It Right from the Beginning: A Critical Examination of Cur-
rent Criminal Defense in Texas and Proposal for a Statewide Public Defender System, 32 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 493, 502–03 & n.30 (citing Alan Berlow, Death in Texas: The Capital of Capital
Punishment Should Heed Illinois’s Example, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2000, at B5 (“[E]ven though
Illinois has a public defender system, thirteen people on death row have been found to be inno-
cent since the reinstatement of the death penalty.”)).
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access to the courts is a central tenet of a democratic society.”329  In
Goldberg v. Kelly,330 the Court emphasized that the “general Wel-
fare” and “Blessings of Liberty” are promoted and secured when the
poor have “the same opportunities that are available to others to par-
ticipate meaningfully in the life of the community.”331  As one com-
mentator notes, “[T]he seeds of a constitutional right to counsel in
civil cases are to be found in Goldberg’s emphasis on the values of
democratic citizenship and community participation and Gideon’s
consideration of procedural equality.”332  Unfortunately, however,
while the “values of civic participation and procedural equality have a
deep pedigree in domestic due process jurisprudence . . . neither Su-
preme Court nor state court decisions addressing the civil right to
counsel have given these values the consideration that they merit.”333
F. The Upside-Down Constitution
In its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has, on the one
hand, shown little deference to the States, but on the other, has also
given states great latitude in executing criminal defendants with intel-
lectual and psychological impairments.  The Founding Fathers created
the Constitution to balance the benefits of a centralized government
against its risks.  Thus, in the pyramid of constitutional power, the
people must always maintain a position above the Constitution, which
in turn, enjoys a position above the coordinate branches.  Of late, the
Court has turned this constitutional hierarchy upside down, with the
people taking the hind-most.  One clear example is the Court’s capital
punishment jurisprudence, a term used loosely in this context, wherein
the Court makes a show of measuring the people’s evolving sense of
decency by tallying state legislative amendments, but in the end ap-
plies its own conception of decency whether it matches the people’s
conception or not.
1. The Devolving Definition of Decency
While “the authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical
prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments . . .
329. Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons from
Domestic and International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260, 2278 (2013).
330. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
331. Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword, Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against
Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68–69 (2007) (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265).
332. Davis, supra note 329, at 2263.
333. Id. at 2281.
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they made no attempt to define the contours of that category.”334
Thus, while the “Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment considered
cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted,” it also
recognizes “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”335  Put differently, “[t]he standard of extreme cru-
elty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judg-
ment,”336 the applicability of which “must change as the basic mores
of society change.”337
The Court has looked to “objective evidence of how our society
views a particular punishment today,”338 to determine whether a pun-
ishment is “graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’”339  In its
view, “the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contempo-
rary values is the ‘legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures,
[(including state legislatures)].’”340  Legislation tends to “reflect the
public attitude toward a given sanction.”341 The Constitution contem-
plates, however, that “in the [end, the Court’s] judgment will be
brought to bear on the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment.”342  For example, the Court will ask “whether
there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry
and its legislators.”343  One can see the people, thereby, tumbling
down the pyramid.
Importantly, however, the Court has invalidated legislation where
no national consensus exists, and where “evolving standards of de-
cency”344 were certainly subject to reasonable disagreement.  In doing
so, the Court has established categorical, bright-line rules that have
prohibited the states from addressing criminal punishment and sen-
334. Adam Lamparello, Incorporating the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Framework
into Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence Through the Introduction of a Contingent-Based and
Legislatively-Driven Constitutional Theory, 88 NEB. L. REV. 692, 731 (2010) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
335. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330–31 (1989) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1951) (plurality opinion)).
336. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
337. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
419 (2008)).
338. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331.
339. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
340. Michael J. O’Connor, Note, What Would Darwin Say?: The Mis-Evolution of the Eighth
Amendment, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1389, 1403 (2003) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 312 (2002)).
341. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
342. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion).
343. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
344. See Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
853, 857 (2013).
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tencing in nuanced ways.  For example, in Roper v. Simmons,345 the
Court categorically prohibited the execution of juveniles. Writing for
the majority, Justice Kennedy held that individuals under the age of
eighteen are more immature and irresponsible than adults, “more vul-
nerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure,” and “have less control, or less experience
with control, over their own environment.”346  Traits such as impulsiv-
ity and immaturity, which are “more transitory [and] less fixed,”347 led
the Court to conclude that crimes committed by juveniles are not
within “a narrow category of the most serious crimes” that are “the
most deserving of execution.”348
The decision has several flaws.  At its core, it was “based on an
individual’s date of birth and without regard to whether a particular
under-eighteen defendant may be death penalty eligible.”349  As com-
mentators note, generalizations and uniformity of treatment “ignore[ ]
real differences”350 and involve “a choice of what factors to leave in
and what factors to leave out, and those choices can prove surprisingly
complicated.”351  Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s “national” consen-
sus was based more on an international consensus, as he noted that
“only seven countries other than the United States have executed ju-
venile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Ni-
geria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China.”352 Kennedy
also found that “[i]n the [fifty-six] years that have passed since the
United Kingdom abolished the juvenile death penalty, the weight of
authority against it there, and in the international community, has be-
come well established.”353
This reliance may have been motivated by the fact that there was no
national consensus on this issue. As Justice Scalia explained in his dis-
sent, only “[eighteen] States—or 47% of States that permit capital
punishment—now have legislation prohibiting the execution of of-
fenders under [eighteen].”354  Indeed, “[w]ords have no meaning if the
views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a na-
345. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
346. Id. at 569.
347. Id. at 570.
348. Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
349. Ronald Turner, The Juvenile Death Penalty and the Court’s Consensus-Plus Eighth
Amendment, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 157, 175 (2006).
350. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 260 (2003).
351. Malcolm Gladwell, Troublemakers: What Pit Bulls Can Teach Us About Profiling, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 6, 2006, at 38, 39.
352. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.
353. Id. at 577–78.
354. Id. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tional consensus.”355  Justice Scalia also took issue with the majority’s
reliance on the twelve states “that had abandoned the death penalty
altogether as part of the consensus against the juvenile death pen-
alty.”356  As he noted, the fact that some “[s]tates favor no executions
says something about consensus against the death penalty, but noth-
ing—absolutely nothing—about consensus that offenders under eigh-
teen deserve special immunity from such a penalty.”357  Ultimately,
this represented an “attempt by the Court to turn its remarkable mi-
nority consensus into a faux majority.”358
Similarly, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,359 the Court held that the death
penalty for the crime of child rape constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.  The majority opinion, again written by Justice Kennedy,
held that “evidence of a national consensus with respect to the death
penalty for child rapists, as with respect to juveniles, mentally re-
tarded offenders, and vicarious felony murderers, shows divided opin-
ion but, on balance, an opinion against it.”360  Specifically, only six out
of the thirty-seven jurisdictions that authorized the death penalty per-
mitted its imposition for the crime of child rape.361
In his dissent, Justice Alito noted that the Court’s prior decision in
Coker v. Georgia,362 which prohibited imposition of the death penalty
for the rape of an adult woman, had “stunted legislative consideration
of . . . whether the death penalty for . . . raping a young child is consis-
tent with prevailing standards of decency.”363  Specifically, in Coker, a
few Justices had expressed reservations about the death penalty gen-
erally, and categorically stated that the death penalty was a dispropor-
tionate penalty for rape.364  Although Coker did not apply to child
rape, it caused hesitation in legislative efforts.  As Justice Alito noted,
“[W]hen state legislators think that the enactment of a new death pen-
alty law is likely to be futile, inaction cannot reasonably be interpreted
as an expression of their understanding of prevailing societal val-
ues.”365  Importantly, however, “in just the past few years, despite the
355. Id.
356. Id. at 610–11.
357. Id. at 611.
358. Roper, 543 U.S. at 611.
359. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
360. Id. at 426.
361. Id.
362. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
363. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 448 (Alito, J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 448–49.
365. Id. at 454.
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shadow cast by the Coker dicta, five States have enacted targeted cap-
ital child-rape laws.”366
2. The Impact on Democracy
The practical—and lasting—effect of the Court’s decision was that
it removed a divisive and unsettled policy issue from the political and
legislative process.  Justice Scalia stated as follows:
If the Eighth Amendment set forth an ordinary rule of law, it would
indeed be the role of this Court to say what the law is.  But the
Court having pronounced that the Eighth Amendment is an ever-
changing reflection of “the evolving standards of decency” of our
society, it makes no sense for the Justices then to prescribe those
standards rather than discern them from the practices of our people.
On the evolving-standards hypothesis, the only legitimate function
of this Court is to identify a moral consensus of the American peo-
ple.  By what conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be
the authoritative conscience of the Nation?367
In other words, “in a democratic society[,] legislatures, not courts,
are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral val-
ues of the people.”368  If, as the majority argued, our “society is ‘evolv-
ing’ toward ever higher ‘standards of decency,’ these decisions might
represent the beginning of a new evolutionary line”369 that begins and
ends with the Court’s normative judgments.
The Court has assured us that “the Eighth Amendment is [not] a
one-way ratchet that prohibits legislatures from adopting new capital
punishment statutes to meet new problems.”370 But the reality does
not match those words.  The categorical rules established in Roper and
Kennedy, not only prevented legislatures from enacting punishments
that, in their view, reflected the depravity of a particular offense, but
they effectuated a permanent change to the Eighth Amendment.
Thus, the Eighth Amendment’s evolution has, in significant part, be-
come a “one-way ratchet”371 that prevents citizens and states from de-
fining decency and human dignity through principled democratic
discourse.
Stated simply, if there is any consensus, it is that the Constitution
does not require one. But the Court does—sometimes.  To illustrate
the bottom line, if any state legislature, in response to a local and se-
366. Id. at 455.
367. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
368. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
369. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 455 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
370. Id. at 469.
371. Id.
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vere crime problem, were to enact any capital legislation that was not
consistent with a majority of the other states, the Court would invali-
date that legislation as soon as it was appealed.  In fact, the state legis-
latures, aware of the Court’s prior capital punishment decisions,
would never waste the state’s time and resources to pass that capital
legislation in the first place.  In that way, the Court is leading and
controlling the “evolving standards of decency” and decidedly not let-
ting the States decide for themselves.
3. Death Is Not Really Different in Democracy
In its death penalty jurisprudence, however, the Court has been far
more hesitant to identify “those offenders who commit ‘a narrow cate-
gory of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes
them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”372  Taking an approach simi-
lar to its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has allowed
states to have almost plenary authority over the manner by which the
death penalty has been imposed.
In Atkins, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
the execution of intellectually disabled defendants.  In the years fol-
lowing Atkins, however, the Court has allowed states to craft their
capital statutes in ways that almost guarantee the execution of intel-
lectually disabled defendants or, at the very least, individuals unde-
serving of execution.373  Some states, for example, place extremely
high burdens of proof on defendants seeking to demonstrate intellec-
tual disability.  Regardless of the burden of proof, the Court has, until
recently,374 refused to intervene in cases where individuals later exe-
cuted showed compelling evidence of cognitive, psychological, and
emotional disabilities.  In Texas, for example, Marvin Wilson was exe-
cuted despite scoring 61 on an IQ test, coupled with significant evi-
dence of adaptive and psychological disabilities.375  If death is truly
372. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
373. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3), (j) (2013).  Georgia is the only state in the
country that requires defendants to prove intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt, a
standard that is nearly impossible to meet, given the imprecise nature of intelligence assessment.
374. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (holding that Florida statute §921.137(1), which
required a defendant to score 70 or below on an IQ test before evidence of adaptive disabilities
could be admitted, violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment).
375. John Rudolf, Marvin Wilson Execution: Texas Puts Man with 61 IQ to Death, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/07/marvin-wil-
son-execution-texas_n_1753968.html; see also Mia-Carre´ B. Long, Of Mice and Men, Fairy Tales,
and Legends: A Reactionary Ethical Proposal to Storytelling and the Brisen˜o Factors, 26 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 859 (2013). Texas uses the following Brisen˜o factors when determining intellec-
tual disability:
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different, and the focus is on “individualized consideration,” then the
procedures for determining death eligibility should also be different.
As one scholar explains, “[C]ourts should be wary when states ap-
pear to exercise their sovereignty at the expense of the individual lib-
erty and democratic autonomy that the system of federalism is meant
to enhance.”376  In the death penalty context, the Court has been any-
thing but wary of state power, and it has shown that death is different
for those with the resources to secure outstanding legal
representation.
G. The Laissez-Faire Constitution
The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence has permitted sub-
stantial encroachments on state and individual autonomy.377  Al-
though the Rehnquist Court “increased state autonomy by limiting
the federal government’s powers through constitutional provisions
such as the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment,”378 subse-
quent decisions have not followed course.379
1. The Decisions
Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be traced back to the dormant
Commerce Clause, which the Court implied from the text of the Con-
1. Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family,
friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that
time, and if so, did he act in accordance with that determination?
2. Has the person formulated plans and carried them through, or is his conduct
impulsive?
3. Does his conduct show leadership, or does it show that he is led around by others?
4. Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of
whether it is socially acceptable?
5. Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions,
or do his responses wander from subject to subject?
6. Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?
7. Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did
the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execu-
tion of purpose?
Id. at 867–68 (quoting Ex parte Brisen˜o, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
376. Bradley A. Harsch, Finding a Sound Commerce Clause Doctrine: Time To Evaluate the
Structural Necessity of Federal Legislation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 983, 1024 (2001).
377. See Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzalez v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species Act Constitu-
tional Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 384 (2007) (“From 1937 until
1995, the Supreme Court applied a very lenient rational basis standard for reviewing congres-
sional legislation under the Commerce Clause, and upheld in every case congressional regulation
of intrastate activities even if the activities had only indirect impacts on interstate commerce.”).
378. Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal Administrative
Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 47 (2008).
379. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
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stitution, and allows Congress not only to regulate, but to prohibit,
state legislation that has an effect on commerce.380  The dormant
Commerce Clause led to the invalidation of “a myriad of state regula-
tions affecting interstate commerce,”381 including “state licensing re-
quirements, train length restrictions, mudguard requirements, truck
length prohibitions, and various produce regulations.”382
Furthermore, in Wickard v. Filburn,383 which one commentator
called the “the final phase of the New Deal revolution in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence,”384 the Court gave Congress the power to regu-
late activity that occurred wholly within a state’s borders.  In Wickard,
the Court held that Congress “could regulate an individual farmer’s
production of wheat for home consumption, notwithstanding the fact
that this consumption occurred on an entirely intrastate basis and, on
its own, undeniably did not have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.”385
The Court held that “the possible aggregate effects on wheat prices
and, hence, on interstate commerce of many farmers’ home consump-
tion of wheat was sufficient to give rise to federal regulatory author-
ity.”386  Cases that followed affirmed this aggregation theory, and also
established a “jurisdictional nexus”387 requirement that granted
“broad federal regulatory authority over things that had previously
passed through interstate commerce.”388  Indeed, for over fifty years,
until the Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez,389 it was all but
settled that “congressional power under the Commerce Clause, com-
plemented by the authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause . . .
extended to all activity that, when aggregated, has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.”390
After Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court appears unwilling or
unable to interpret the Constitution to impose meaningful, substan-
tive limits on Congress’s enumerated powers.  Although the Rehn-
quist Court flirted with substantive limits on congressional power,
380. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitu-
tional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 570–72.
381. Id. at 574.
382. Id. at 574–75 (footnotes omitted).
383. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
384. Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1262 (2003).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 1264.
388. Id.
389. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
390. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 637 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
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the specter of such meaningful limits “is now water over the dam.”
Raich therefore signals that the “political safeguards of federalism”
will largely drive the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Ac-
cording to this view, there are procedural limits on Congress’s enu-
merated powers inherent in congressional representation.  Thus,
because the states are represented in the national political process,
Congress can adequately protect the federal-state balance of
power.391
When combined with “the Chevron deference [given] to agency in-
terpretations of ambiguous statutory terms”392 and “underenforce-
ment of the nondelegation doctrine,”393 the Court has allowed
Congress to regulate intrastate activity even where the effect on inter-
state commerce is highly attenuated.
2. The Impact on Democracy
The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence has upset the balance
of federalism between Congress and the states.394  One scholar ex-
plains that “the system of federalism serves to . . . protect individual
liberty and democratic autonomy.”395  It also strives to “maintain the
closest possible connection between those who govern and those who
are governed; ensure that government remains as responsive as possi-
ble to local interests; and preserve the ability of the states to offer
diverse solutions to social problems.”396  Thus, “ensuring that federal
legislation is preferred to that of the states only when there is a need
for it . . . would avoid the unnecessary concentrations of centralized
power that are anathema to these important functions.”397
Additionally, “like the express guarantees contained in the Bill of
Rights, [federalism] is meant as a guarantor of personal freedom.”398
As such, federalism “was not meant merely to protect the sovereignty
391. Keller, supra note 377, at 53–54 (footnotes omitted).
392. Id. at 59.
393. Id. at 60.
394. Redish & Nugent, supra note 380, at 588–89. The authors summarize the federalism
framework as follows:
In one category of situations the states are expressly and absolutely prohibited from
enacting certain types of legislation.  In the second category, the states must overcome
Congress’s institutional inertia in order to obtain congressional authorization for the
state legislation.  In the third category, the states are free to enact legislation; Congress,
however, has authority to preempt or overrule such state action by legislation enacted
pursuant to one of its enumerated powers.
Id. at 591.
395. Harsch, supra note 376, at 1010.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
166 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:113
interests of the states,”399 but to “ensure protection of our ‘fundamen-
tal liberties,’”400 with states acting as “[the] primary defenders.”401
Thus, the aggregation of power at the national level harms individual
liberty, while the states have a responsibility to “protect the rights of
their citizens not only by creating and enforcing new rights, but also
by simply checking the power of the federal government.”402  As Pro-
fessor and Judge Guido Calabresi explains, “[F]ederalism is much
more important to the liberty and well[-]being of the American peo-
ple than any other structural feature of our constitutional system.”403
One commentator explains as follows:
The notion of self-governance cannot be anything but a fiction if
citizens are so remote from decision-makers that their ability to af-
fect legislation becomes marginal.  Thus, when the government ex-
ercises power over an individual, the democratic citizen should have
some reasonable means of affecting the process by which that
power is wielded.404
In other words, “[t]he more distant the political machinery, the
more the average citizen is deprived of the autonomy that is central to
democratic ideals.”405
Until the Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius,406 the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
has given Congress wide-ranging power over primarily local activity,
and has thereby infringed upon state autonomy and individual liberty.
This has led to an implicit type of preemption, whereby broad regula-
tory policies have constructively deprived the states from offering
competing legislation that responds to uniquely local concerns.407  In
effect, the Court’s jurisprudence has aggregated federal power and
that has further attenuated the link between lawmaking and citizen
participation.
Furthermore, because the Court has invalidated state legislation
“even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute,”408 and has used
399. Id.
400. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
401. John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safegaurds of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1313 (1997).
402. Id.
403. Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 754 (1995).
404. Harsch, supra note 376, at 1011–12.
405. Id. at 1112.
406. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  In Sebelius, the Court held that the Affordable Health Care Act’s
individual mandate to purchase health insurance (or face a penalty) was not authorized under
the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2593.
407. Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice
Clarence Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 63, 84 (2010).
408. Id. at 80 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)).
2014] THE UNEQUAL CONSTITUTION 167
an aggregate “effects” test409 that allows Congress to regulate individ-
ual behavior that itself has no impact on interstate commerce, the bal-
ance has shifted mightily in favor of the federal government.  Thus, in
certain areas, federal statutes, not state laws,  directly and predomi-
nantly govern citizens.  And, when the states are shut out of the legis-
lative process, citizens cannot participate meaningfully in the
democratic process. Put differently, although every citizen can vote,
many citizens do not have a voice in governance.
H. The Live Free or Die Constitution
The Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York,410 which invalidated
the Bakeshop Act of 1895 (Bakeshop Act), showed the ugly side of
substantive due process.
1. The Decision
One provision in the Bakeshop Act prohibited employees from
working “in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confectionary establish-
ment more than sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten hours
in any one day.”411  The Bakeshop Act also contained several provi-
sions regulating sanitation, and was largely enacted in response to the
sub-standard working conditions to which employees were subject.
The New York State legislature unanimously passed the Bakeshop
Act,412 which came at a time when there were no minimum wage or
overtime provisions.413
In a 5–4 decision, the Court struck down the hourly and daily work
limits. In his dissent, Justice Harlan stated as follows:
[Granting] that there is a liberty of contract which cannot be vio-
lated even under the sanction of direct legislative enactment, but . . .
we may assume, that such liberty of contract is subject to such regu-
lations as the State may reasonably prescribe for the common good
and the well-being of society, what are the conditions under which
the judiciary may declare such regulations to be in excess of legisla-
tive authority and void?  Upon this point there is no room for dis-
pute, for, the rule is universal that a legislative enactment, Federal
or state, is never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it be, be-
409. Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive Political Theory
and the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 403, 410
(2003).
410. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
411. Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Tradition or Change in Constitutional Law?, 1 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 404, 407 (2005) (quoting New York Bakeshop Act of 1895, ch. 518, § 1, 1895
N.Y. Laws 305, 305).
412. Id. at 407–08.  The Act passed by a vote of 120-0. Id. at 408.
413. Id. at 407.
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yond question, plainly and palpably in excess of legislative
power.414
As one scholar explains, Justice Harlan “plainly thought the major-
ity had ignored a traditional presumption in favor of the workings of
democracy.”415  It was based “on a brand of individualism that was far
from universally accepted in its time,”416 and, as Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes stated, “an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain.”417  While some viewed Lochner as a “rec-
ognition of liberty-of-contract doctrine,”418 the “presumption [it cre-
ated] in favor of that liberty represented a radical shift or usurpation
of power in favor of the federal courts and to the disadvantage of state
legislatures.”419
In addition, rather than “reflecting laissez-faire economics,”420
Lochner and its progeny revealed a “concern with government neu-
trality and opposition to class legislation,”421 which was consistent
with the principles of Jacksonian democracy.  Jacksonians eschewed
“special privilege” or “special legislation” that burdened particular in-
dividuals or groups because it created “artificial inequalities of wealth
and tended to concentrate political power.”422  They believed that
“doling out special privilege created a vicious cycle that threatened
both liberty and democracy”423 because “[a]rtificial inequalities of
wealth gave those with the most money the means with which to influ-
ence government.”424  Importantly, though, “when Jacksonians took
aim at government, they were not thinking of government as a regula-
tor,”425 but rather as “a source of wealth and privilege that put too
much power in the hands of too few individuals.”426
414. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
415. Kens, supra note 411, at 412.
416. Id. at 411.
417. Id. (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
418. Id. at 412–13.
419. Id. at 413.
420. Id. at 417.
421. Kens, supra note 411, at 417.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
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2. The Impact on Democracy
In many ways, Lochner “remained true to the aspect of Jacksonian
democracy that favored government neutrality, but not to its underly-
ing ideals.”427  At its core, Lochner was hostile to democracy:
It was driven by a fear that the workings of democracy might under-
mine the economic and social system that had created that wealth.
In essence, it turned the ideal of Jacksonian democracy on its head.
Implicit in the charge that legislation such as the New York
Bakeshop Act was class legislation was the idea that wage earners,
farmers, artisans, and laborers represented the forces of political
privilege, and that corporations and powerful business interests
were the oppressed.428
Lochner also ushered in an era of unprecedented judicial power.
Thus, when “concentrated corporate power was becoming predomi-
nant,” workers and reformers . . . . turned to the government for help
“in the name of individual liberty.”429  The Court accepted the invita-
tion and began issuing rulings that protected individual rights, but at
the cost of invalidating legislation that did not violate any express or
implied constitutional rights.
Lochner marked the beginning of a more robust and extratextual
application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process
doctrine.  As Professor Randy Barnett explains, “Lochner is indeed
problematic because it violates the original meaning of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”430  Indeed, it “distorts
the original meaning of ‘liberty’ in the Due Process Clause by stretch-
ing its meaning beyond the matter of deprivation of liberty by impris-
onment.”431  In other words, the “Due Process Clause is aimed mainly
at the judicial branch of state governments and enjoins them from
sanctioning the violation of otherwise proper laws without following
procedures that ensure accurate outcomes.”432  The Court’s interpre-
tation of liberty as a substantive Fourtheenth Amendment guarantee
also conveniently gives the Court primary authority over its applica-
tion to individuals.
The problem is that however the Court defines liberty in a particu-
lar case, it is almost always certain to disfavor a particular individual
or group, shift power in favor of the federal government, and truncate
427. Kens, supra note 411, at 417.
428. Id. at 417–18.
429. Id. at 418.
430. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword, What’s So Wicked About Lochner?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Lib-
erty 325, 329 (2005).
431. Id. at 332.
432. Id. at 331.
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state-wide democratic debate.  The Court’s definitions have led pre-
cisely to this effect.  In its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, for exam-
ple, the Court has refused to define liberty as protecting egregious
instances of incompetent representation. Similarly, in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has allowed states to erect bar-
riers that make it difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate intellec-
tual disability.  Last, the broad deference given to Congress under the
Commerce Clause shows little regard for the autonomy or liberty of
state governments.
In its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, however, the Court
has adopted a Lochner-esque model, wherein liberty has encompassed
a broad array of extratextual “rights,” stifling democratic discourse.
But when the Court relied on First Amendment liberty principles to
invalidate campaign finance legislation, it ensured that inequality in
the political process would continue.  Striking down the line item veto,
which was made in the name of liberty and wedded to the Constitu-
tion’s text, also prohibited the Government from operating more effi-
ciently.  These decisions underscore the trappings of a liberty-centered
jurisprudence: individuals lose power, representative democracy di-
minishes, and courts become the arbiters of policy, not simply law.
I. The “Stare Indecisis” Constitution
The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has followed a tor-
tured path as the Court has unnecessarily and unhelpfully engaged in
a process of appending exception after exception and doctrine after
doctrine in an effort putatively intended to “clarify” the fifty-four
words of the Fourth Amendment.  That process has resulted in Fourth
Amendment interpretations that are unclear, inconsistent, and elevate
spurious analogies over constitutional rights.  The Court’s Fourth
Amendment interpretation process has yielded only “stare indecisis.”
Rather than adding new exceptions and new doctrines, the Court
should return to the “reasonableness” standard explicit in the Fourth
Amendment.
Reasonableness is not just the Framers’ conception; rather, reasona-
bleness is the requirement the people inserted into the Constitution,
the contract between the people and the People’s government.  Any
court opinion that uses some artificial exception or inapt analogy to
hold constitutional any unreasonable search or seizure is, itself, un-
constitutional. In short, unreasonable searches and seizures are un-
constitutional whether they fit into some recognized exception or
doctrine or not.  The Court’s flawed Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence is not of recent vintage.
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1. The Decisions
The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is rife with artificial
exceptions and spurious doctrines that depart from the reasonableness
requirement that the people inserted into the Constitution.
The fifty-four words of the Fourth Amendment provide:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.433
Thus, the constitutional watchword is reasonableness—not wingspan,
immediately associated, bright-line, or the like.  The clarity of the sim-
ple word “reasonableness” notwithstanding, the Court has repeatedly
“construed” that simple word in ways that render its meaning unclear,
allowing searches and seizures that are undeniably unreasonable.  A
few examples will suffice to illuminate this point.
In 1967, in Katz v. United States,434 the Court was grappling with the
advent of electronic means of intercepting landline telephone conver-
sations.435  Law enforcement officers installed listening and recording
equipment on an outdoor, glass-sided public phone booth; the defen-
dant’s side of the conversation was intercepted and used against him
in a criminal trial.436  The Court held that interception to be an uncon-
stitutional search and seizure.437  Arising out of Justice Harlan’s con-
currence, and moving away from earlier trespass-based Fourth
Amendment formulations,438 was born the two-pronged subjective
and objective reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine.439 The
Court has largely eschewed trespass formulations440 and instead ad-
hered to the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine since Katz.
But the Katz formulation is no improvement at all over the words of
the Fourth Amendment itself; in fact, applying the Katz reasonable
433. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
434. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
435. Id. at 348.
436. Id. at 348, 352.
437. Id. at 358–59.
438. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that “wire tap-
ping” that does not involve physical intrusion into the protected place is not a Fourth Amend-
ment search).
439. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
440. There has been at least one recent and notable exception wherein the Court cobbled
together a plurality in a GPS tracking case with about half of the plurality Justices applying the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy formulation and the other half applying a trespass the-
ory.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  This GPS tracking case is discussed more
thoroughly in a later part of this section.
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expectation of privacy formula distracts the Court from more straight-
forward applications of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits—“un-
reasonable searches and seizures.”  Simply put, the Katz telephone
booth interception was a constitutionally unreasonable search and
seizure; the Court need not have invented a new hurdle.  The only
necessary hurdle is the one that has existed since 1791.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the Court’s search incident to
arrest jurisprudence. In Chimel v. California,441 the Court held that
law enforcement may conduct warrantless searches of an arrestee’s
person for the purpose of protecting officer safety and preserving evi-
dence.442 In 1973, in United States v. Robinson, the Court evaluated
whether officers could search, incident to arrest, the contents of a cig-
arette pack found in the arrestee’s pocket.443  Although the question
should have been whether the search was constitutionally “unreasona-
ble,” the Court devised a new test: whether the item the officers in-
tend to search had been on the arrestee’s person at the time of the
arrest.444  In the years since Robinson, instead of courts focusing on
whether the search of items found on the arrestee was reasonable, the
courts focused on whether the item had been associated with the per-
son of the arrestee at the time of the arrest.  But the “associated with
the person of the arrestee” test is not prescribed by the Constitution;
rather, the Constitution prescribes the “reasonableness” test.  Arising
out of the Court’s desire to clarify these decisions for officers and
courts alike, the Court has only managed to yield more confusion,
“stare indecisis,” and move further away from what the Constitution
requires: reasonableness.
441. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
442. Id. at 762-63. The Court stated:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endan-
gered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arrest-
ing officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction.
Id.
443. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
444. Id. at 235.  It is important to note that the Court in Robinson also held that search to be
constitutionally reasonable: “It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasona-
ble’ search under that Amendment.” Id. at 235.  Nonetheless, subsequent courts applied Robin-
son not for the constitutional reasonableness holding but for its “found on the person of the
arrestee” formulation, thereby moving farther away from the constitutional reasonableness
guarantee.
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The “associated with the person” test may have reflected an at-
tempt to determine the reasonableness of law enforcement’s conduct,
but in practice this test led to an unprincipled expansion of law en-
forcement’s power above and beyond Chimel’s original justifications.
For example, in 1981, the Court more blatantly elevated expediency
over the “reasonableness” guarantee in the Fourth Amendment.  In
Belton v. New York,445 the Court ignored the pure “reasonableness”
standard in favor of a bright-line rule that officers could search the
interior of a motor vehicle, incident to the arrest of its recent occu-
pant.  The Court adopted that bright-line rule rather than adhering to
the constitutional reasonableness standard under the theory that of-
ficers would find a bright-line rule easier to apply.446  But that is the
very essence of elevating expedience over constitutional guarantees.
Furthermore, for many years after the Belton bright-line rule was
created, lower courts spent much of their time determining whether a
search was valid as incident to its occupant’s arrest, or whether the
arrestee had been a “recent occupant,” rather than determining
whether the search of the vehicle was reasonable, as the Constitution
requires.  This was a misdirection of the highest order, diverting of-
ficers from their real quest—enforcing law in a manner that is consis-
tent with the Constitution—and diverting courts from their real task—
construing the constitutionality of those law enforcement actions.
What the Court presumably had intended to clarify in order to make
both tasks easier, only yielded confusion, indecision, and unconstitu-
tional searches and seizures—“stare indecisis.”
In United States v. Jones,447 the Court continued to wrestle with
searches and seizures using technological advancements spawned in
the digital era—specifically, warrantless GPS tracking of a suspect ve-
hicle.  Again, rather than merely divining whether the GPS tracking
“search” was constitutionally “reasonable,” the Court straddled two
doctrines: the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy,448 and tres-
445. 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that the search incident to arrest exception extended to
motor vehicles when a “recent occupant” had been arrested), abrogated by Davis v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
446. As Justice Brennan rued in dissent, “The Court today turns its back on the product of
that analysis, formulating an arbitrary ‘bright-line’ rule applicable to ‘recent’ occupants of auto-
mobiles that fails to reflect Chimel’s underlying policy justifications.” Id. at 463 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (referring to Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969), in which the Court
identified the twin rationales for the warrantless search incident to arrest doctrine: (1) officer
safety; and (2) safeguarding evidence from destruction or loss).
447. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
448. Id. at 950–52 (plurality opinion) (elucidating the trespass theory in which Justice Scalia is
joined by three Justices).
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pass.449  That straddling is not compelled by the Constitution, nor does
it help the Court ensure that only “reasonable” searches are
permitted.
2. The Impact on Democracy
Imagine how many searches have been conducted since Katz was
decided in 1967, in which the court found no reasonable expectation
of privacy, ending the inquiry there with no additional determination
of whether the search was nonetheless constitutionally unreasonable.
Imagine how many searches of items in arrestees’ pockets were con-
ducted following the Robinson search incident to arrest doctrine, and
imagine how many of those were, in fact, constitutionally unreasona-
ble searches.  For example, many would argue that essentially every
warrantless search of the memory of an arrestee’s cell phone was con-
stitutionally unreasonable, but almost no court has bothered with that
question, because the expedience of the Robinson doctrine was so
close at hand.
Imagine how many arrestees’ vehicles were searched without a war-
rant in the twenty-eight years between 1981’s Belton and 2009’s Ari-
zona v. Gant,450 not because they were deemed constitutionally
“reasonable,” but because they fit, often quite poorly,451 the expedient
Belton bright-line rule.
Finally, imagine the uncertainty flowing from the Court’s fractured
decision in Jones, leaving us all to wonder whether we have returned
to the Olmstead trespass formulation, will henceforth apply the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy formulation, or can simply return to
449. Justices Sotomayor and Alito concurred separately and in favor of the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy theory. Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also id. at 957–64 (Alito,
J., concurring).  Indeed, Justice Sotomayor signed opinions in favor of both the trespass and
reasonable expectation of privacy formulations. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
450. 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (effectively reviving the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine
and overturning the Belton bright-line rule for warrantless motor vehicle searches incident to
arrest).
451. Belton vehicle searches incident to arrest were deemed constitutional even if the arrestee
was in handcuffs, in the locked squad car, and on the way to the stationhouse, all of which could
easily be seen as constitutionally unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding the search pursuant to Belton’s bright-line rule where the arrestee
had been removed from the automobile and was in handcuffs and secured when the warrantless
search of the vehicle incident to arrest was conducted).  That court read Belton
as creating a bright-line rule that, incident to and contemporaneous with a valid custo-
dial arrest of the occupant of a vehicle, the police may search the passenger compart-
ment of the vehicle without regard to whether the occupant was removed and secured
at the time of the search.  This reading is in accord with that of every other circuit that
has considered the question.
Id. at 549.
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the Constitution’s “reasonableness” guarantee.  Contrary to some the-
ories, reasonableness, while a flexible and malleable concept, is not
difficult to apply.  The Court need not replace constitutional “reason-
ableness,” a concept officers apply routinely throughout every work-
day, with newer doctrines that simply increase the distance between
the people and their constitutional rights.  Whenever the Court’s deci-
sions yield more “stare indecisis,” they create greater uncertainty
about whether the people’s right to be free from “unreasonable
searches and seizures”  will be protected against the arbitrary exercise
of law enforcement authority.  In cases such as Belton, where the an-
swer to that questions was no, the Fourth Amendment was separated
from its original purpose, and the Constitution became more unequal
for millions of unsuspecting motorists.
J. The Larcenous Constitution
In Kelo v. City of New London,452 the Court broadly interpreted the
Fifth Amendment to give local governments unprecedented power to
take private property—in essence, condoning larceny.
1. The Decision
In Kelo, a local government seized private property as part of a
larger redevelopment plan.453  The plan included “a waterfront con-
ference hotel anchoring a cluster of restaurants and shops,”454 as well
as “a marina, new homes, a museum, and office space.”455  City offi-
cials claimed that the plan “would create jobs, generate tax revenue,
make the city aesthetically more appealing, and create recreational
opportunities.”456
Several local landowners objected to the taking, however, claiming
that it was not for “public use.”457  Indeed, the Court acknowledged
that the City was “not planning to open all of the condemned land for
the general public’s use, either through public ownership or transfer of
the property to private entities operating public accommodations.”458
Nonetheless, the Court rejected a narrow reading of “public use” and
held that the taking was permissible under the Fifth Amendment.459
452. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
453. Id. at 472–73.
454. Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London: Eminent Domain,
Federalism, and Congressional Powers, 32 J. LEGIS. 165, 168 (2006).
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475).
458. Id. at 169.
459. Id.
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Specifically, the redevelopment plan served an overarching “public
purpose,”460 which “has traditionally been defined ‘broadly’ and re-
flects the Court’s ‘longstanding policy of deference to legislative judg-
ments’ with respect to such matters.”461  In its view, “[p]romoting
economic development [was] a traditional and long accepted function
of government,”462 even if part of the development would neither
benefit nor be open to the public.  The majority explained that it
“wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of af-
fording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs
justify the use of the takings power.”463
In her dissent, Justice O’Connor argued that the Court’s decision
departed from a “long-held, basic limitation on government
power.”464  The city’s redevelopment plan did not fall within any of
the three well-settled categories defining public use: (1) to transfer
“private property to public ownership—such as for a road, a hospital,
or a military base;” (2) to transfer private property “to [other] private
parties, often common carriers, who make the property available for
the public’s use—such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a sta-
dium;” and (3) to “serve a public purpose . . . even if the property is
destined for subsequent private use.”465  In Justice O’Connor’s view,
the taking did not fall within any of those categories, and blurred the
distinction between public and private uses:
Under the banner of economic development, all private property is
now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private
owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who
will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the
public—in the process.  To reason, as the Court does, that the inci-
dental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of
private property render economic development takings “for public
use” is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of
property—and thereby effectively to delete the words “for public
use” from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.466
Thus, “[a]ny property may now be taken for the benefit of another
private party,”467 and the “beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens
with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, in-
460. Bell, supra note 454, at 169 (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480).
461. Id. (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480).
462. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
463. Id. at 483.
464. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
465. Id. at 497–98.
466. Id. at 494.
467. Id. at 505.
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cluding large corporations and development firms.”468  Justice Thomas
echoed these concerns in his dissent, stating that “[s]omething has
gone seriously awry with this Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution.”469
2. The Impact on Democracy
The Court’s decision embraced a view of democracy that is hostile
to individual rights and liberty.  It also highlighted the two drastically
different viewpoints concerning the nature and function of a democ-
racy and the role that individuals should have as participants.  One
commentator describes the majority as subscribing to the Blackstone
and Hobbesian view, which “sees the government as primary and indi-
viduals as secondary.”470  Proponents of this approach believe that
“rights are created by the society for certain prudential reasons, and
when society’s ‘diverse and always evolving needs’ require that the
citizen relinquish those rights, the courts should not stand in the
way.”471  The Lockean view, on the other hand, “sees government as a
tool for protecting the rights of individuals against the wrongs of
others, and sees the overriding goal of constitutionalism as preventing
government from being perverted into a tool for violating those
rights.”472
By embracing the Hobbesian view, the Court embraced a view of
individual liberty that was far removed from other constitutional con-
texts and applied a pragmatism that dismissed the importance of a
participatory democracy.  In many ways, Kelo demonstrates just how
distorted our constitutional jurisprudence has become.  There is no
internal consistency underlying the Court’s decisions, and certainly no
clear commitment to the Constitution’s substantive values of liberty,
equality, and democratic governance.  The principle that does emerge
from these and other decisions is that the Court places government,
particularly at the federal level, atop the constitutional pyramid.  Indi-
viduals have a right to privacy that encompasses abortion, but indigent
criminal defendants do not have a meaningful right to counsel; citizens
have little more than a symbolic vote at the ballot box; and property
owners are subject to eminent domain powers that benefit other pri-
vate economic interests.  This is neither a society of self-governance,
468. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505.
469. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
470. Timothy Sandefur, Mine and Thine Distinct: What Kelo Says About Our Path, 10 CHAP.
L. REV. 1, 48 (2006).
471. Id.
472. Id.
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nor is it a system governed by law.  It is rule by the elite, dominated by
power and wealth.  The result is not simply disillusionment with the
political process.  It is the loss of liberty and equality in a fundamental
sense, and the culprit is the Court’s presumably well-intentioned but
misguided pragmatism.
Ultimately, there is no perfect solution to these problems.  But that
is the point.  If states are the laboratories of democracy, then they
must be permitted to experiment with policies that address the unique
needs of their residents.  While states must, of course, operate within
constitutional constraints, including reasonable extensions of the text,
they are also entitled to the benefits of the Constitution’s vision for
de-centralized governance.  This means giving states and their citizens
the power to the define equality, liberty, and democracy in different
ways, and the authority to enact regulations that equalize access to the
political process.
IV. REASONABLY CONSTRUING THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT,
PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, AND PRESERVING
DEMOCRACY
The above discussion does not mean that the Court should narrowly
construe the Constitution’s text, apply a strictly originalist perspective,
or ignore the evolution of our society. But it does suggest that a pri-
mary consideration in constitutional cases should be “whether the op-
portunity to participate . . . in the political processes . . . has been
unduly constricted.”473
A pragmatic approach that eschews unsupported interpretations of
the text and normative authority, in favor of facilitating egalitarian
democratic processes, can ensure that individual rights and procedural
equality are protected against arbitrary deprivation.  Below is an ex-
ample in which the Court has interpreted the Constitution’s text rea-
sonably, and in so doing, enhanced both of these values.
A. Pragmatism and Individual Rights: United States v. Windsor
In United States v. Windsor,474 the Court correctly held that the De-
fense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which confined the definition of
marriage to opposite-sex couples, impermissibly discriminated against
homosexuals and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause.475
473. ELY, supra note 217, at 77 (discussing Carolene Products v. United States, 304 U.S. 144
(1938)).
474. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
475. Id. at 2693.
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As the Court noted, “moral disapproval of homosexuality”476 was not
a legitimate basis upon which to exclude an entire group of citizens
from the substantial federal benefits that opposite sex couples receive.
The Court’s landmark decision was an important step forward in
the fight for marriage equality.  However, Justice Kennedy’s decision
was tainted with the same type of extratextual rhetoric that drove the
Court’s earlier substantive due process decisions.  For example, Justice
Kennedy stated that DOMA was “unconstitutional as a deprivation of
the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.”477  The opinion also stated that DOMA “imposes a dis-
ability”478 and results in “second tier marriage[s].”479  Ultimately,
while Justice Kennedy invoked the “powerful language of liberty,
equality, and dignity,”480 the Court ordered a “limited form of
change.”481
The more pragmatic and democratic approach would have been to
invalidate DOMA, and same-sex marriage bans generally, based on
the text of the Equal Protection Clause.482  Some may argue that this
is not necessarily consistent with the clause’s original meaning,483 but
it is a reasonable extension of the text—and right—that the Equal
Protection Clause seeks to achieve.  Equality would have little mean-
ing if it required only the equal administration of laws that in them-
selves cause inequality.  Procedural and substantive equality require
much more. With respect to same-sex marriage bans, they require
states to provide, at the very least, a rational basis for limiting mar-
riage to heterosexual couples. Thus far, the states have provided no
476. Id.
477. Id. at 2695.
478. Id. at 2695–96; see also Douglas NeJaime, The View from Below: Public Interest Lawyer-
ing, Social Change, and Adjudication, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 182, 203 (2013); Jerry El-
mer, United States v. Windsor: Another Victory for Gay Rights, 62 R.I. B.J., Sept./Oct. 2013, at
13, 32.
479. 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
480. NeJaime, supra note 478, at 203.
481. Id.
482. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
483. Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV.
493, 576–78 (2013) (explaining that a narrow interpretation is not compelled by the original
meaning or intent of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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such justification,484 and the true motive  underlying these bans—
moral disapproval of same-sex couples—is precisely what the Equal
Protection Clause forbids.
But the Court did not send this message in Windsor because its
opinion was overrun with powerful rhetoric and generalized platitudes
about liberty.  While this language certainly reflected hostility toward
DOMA itself, it was not grounded in the Constitution’s text or on the
rights guaranteed therein.  As a result, the Court in Windsor “blurred
doctrinal categories,”485 and failed to say what the Constitution and
Marbury give it the duty to say: these laws have no rational basis
whatsoever and offend the textual guarantee of equality.  An equality-
based decision would have demonstrated judicial restraint, a commit-
ment to the Constitution’s inalienable rights, and given same-sex
couples a stronger voice in the democratic process.
B. Intrastate Application of the Eighth Amendment
The Court’s pragmatism must ensure that the constitutional limits it
places on state governments and individuals also apply to its decision-
making process.  Otherwise, the Court will continue to be the un-
checked final arbiter of a law’s constitutionality while simultaneously
retaining the power to rewrite or expand that law.  That would, in
effect, allow the Court to have legislative oversight authority, subject
to only those textual restraints that the Court chooses to impose on
itself.  There is nothing separate or equal about such a system, particu-
larly in a society that values checks and balances.
One way that the Court can balance its countermajoritarian duty
with the promotion of egalitarian democratic processes is to adopt an
intrastate application of the Eighth Amendment. In other words, in-
stead of issuing decisions that become national policy, the Court
should restrain the reach of its decisions to the state within which the
law was enacted.
Thus, in assessing the “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,”486 the Court would search for a local,
not national, consensus.  It would assess public support for a particular
law based on opinion polls within that state, and on the uniquely local
needs to which the law responds.  In so doing, the “judgment reached
484. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the argument
that protecting child welfare justifies same-sex marriage bans).
485. Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 778 (2013).
486. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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by the citizenry and its legislators”487 would more directly reflect the
views of those who actually participated in the law’s enactment.
Additionally, in the criminal context, the Court would consider the
punishments given for similar crimes in that state, the public support
for a particular criminal sanction, and the sentences of juries within
that state, to ascertain “the [local] public attitude toward a given sanc-
tion.”488  This type of review would recognize that the public attitudes
most worthy of consideration are the attitudes of the people within
that state—those to whom the law applies, and who are responsible
for its creation.
Ultimately, an intrastate paradigm would apply where laws do not
plainly or facially violate the Constitution’s text.  This paradigm would
recognize that states have a right to be different, provided that they
adhere to the outer limits imposed by the Constitution.  Uniformity
does not lead to a “better” form of equality, just like it did not make
the sentencing process fairer.489  It does not account for people’s di-
verse perspectives on issues relating to life and liberty, and does not
accord sufficient respect for local democratic processes.  In fact, it dis-
respects the substantial differences, values, and perspectives that citi-
zens within each state are constitutionally entitled to have.
This approach would also give a more democratic and constitution-
ally significant voice to the views of citizens within each state.  For
example, if Louisiana decides to execute individuals who are con-
victed of child kidnapping and rape resulting in great bodily harm and
mental anguish, and the public attitude supports such a sanction, it
should have that right. Likewise, if New York decides to ban all corpo-
rate campaign contributions during gubernatorial races, it should be
permitted to do so.  If Minnesota passes legislation outlawing the
manufacture of videos depicting the torture of animals,490 it should
not face invalidation by the Court.
Letting New York do things one way, while Louisiana and Minne-
sota do it another, is not a novel idea.  But it does not factor into the
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, even though it is an ideal method
by which to facilitate meaningful citizen participation at the state level
and could contribute to a more robust democratic discourse in which
487. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002).
488. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion).
489. See, e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45
STAN. L. REV. 523 (1993).
490. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 48, which
banned “the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty,” on
the ground that it was unconstitutionally overbroad).
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laws change from the bottom up and  not the top down.  If, for exam-
ple, citizens are unhappy with a particular law, they can collectively
advocate for change or petition the state courts for redress.  As it
stands now, citizens have too little influence, and federal courts have
far too much power.
Intrastate judicial review would also ensure that all three branches
of government adhere to the limits imposed by the Constitution.  In
Washington v. Glucksberg,491 the Court stated as follows:
By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty
interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of
public debate and legislative action.  We must therefore “exercise
the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this
field,” lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this
Court.492
This exception, of course, would apply in situations where laws
plainly violate the Constitution’s text.  That is when uniformity is not
only desirable, but is required by the Constitution.  This rule would
ensure that much of what has changed in recent jurisprudence would
remain the same.  The laws overruled in cases such as Brown v. Board
of Education493 and Loving v. Virginia494 would not suddenly become
constitutional.  They were never constitutional, and exemplify the ar-
bitrary and injurious exercise of state power.  And this is not to say
that restrictions on abortion can never be unconstitutional.  Perhaps,
as one court has held, they constitute gender discrimination495 or, as
some have argued, violate the equal protection clause.  The point is
that, before a law is invalidated, there must be a legitimate constitu-
tional basis. In cases such as Roe, there was none.
V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution should not be a political chess match, and out-
comes should not depend to such a large degree on the composition of
the Court.  The text’s written and unwritten mandates speak to a sin-
gle value that should unite jurists of all interpretive persuasions: the
people, and not legislatures or courts, own the Constitution’s enumer-
491. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
492. Id. at 720 (citations omitted) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992)).
493. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
494. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
495. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in
Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
97 (2005).
2014] THE UNEQUAL CONSTITUTION 183
ated rights and have a corresponding right to define those that are not
enumerated.  But those rights have not been fully realized because the
Constitution has been applied in a separate and unequal manner.
The wealthy have increased access to the political process, the poor
are disproportionately affected by the criminal justice system, and the
Court has the final say in many matters that should be left to the dem-
ocratic discourse.  The Constitution does not always guarantee equal
outcomes, but it does envision equal access, which is the predicate to
an active and evolving form of liberty.  The Court should embrace a
new form of pragmatism that enhances each citizen’s participation in
local and national governance, and that eschews overly narrow or im-
permissibly broad interpretations of the text.  If the Constitution can-
not guarantee procedural and substantive equality for all, then active
liberty and participatory democracy will belong to the few.
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